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ABSTRACT
I survey work on the intersection between macroeconomics and finance. The challenge is to find the
right measure of "bad times," rises in the marginal value of wealth, so that we can understand high
average returns or low prices as compensation for assets' tendency to pay off poorly in "bad times."
I survey the literature, covering the time-series and cross-sectional facts, the equity premium,
consumption-based  models,  general  equilibrium  models,  and  labor  income/idiosyncratic  risk
approaches.
John H. Cochrane
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Risk premia
Some assets oﬀer higher average returns than other assets, or, equivalently, they attract
lower prices. These “risk premiums” should reﬂect aggregate, macroeconomic risks; they
should reﬂect the tendency of assets to do badly in bad economic times. I survey research
on the central question: what is the nature of macroeconomic risk that drives risk premia in
asset markets?








t+1 is a random payoﬀ of a speciﬁc asset i,a n dmt+1 is a stochastic discount factor.













The ﬁrst term is the risk-neutral present value. The second term is the crucial discount for
risk — a large negative covariance generates a low or “discounted” price. Applied to excess






The expected excess return or “risk premium” is higher for assets that have a large negative
covariance with the discount factor.





1From (1), we have for gross returns R,
1=E(mR)
and for a zero-cost excess return Re = Ri − Rj.
0=E(mRe).
Using the deﬁnition of covariance, and 1 = E(m)Rf for a real risk-free rate,
0=E(m)E(Re)+cov(m,Re)
E(Re)=−Rfcov(m,Re)
For small time intervals Rf ≈ 1s ow eh a v e
E(Re)=−cov(m,Re).
This equation holds exactly in continuous time.
1This is a simple statement of an investor’s ﬁrst order conditions. The marginal value of
wealth VW answers the question “how much happier would you be if you found a dollar on
the street?” It measures “hunger” — marginal utility, not total utility. The discount factor
is high at t + 1 if you desperately want more wealth at t + 1 — and would be willing to give
up a lot of wealth in other dates or states to get it.
Equation (3) thus says that the risk premium E(Rei) is driven by the covariance of returns
with the marginal value of wealth.2 G i v e nt h a ta na s s e tm u s td ow e l ls o m e t i m e sa n dd o
badly at other times, investors would rather it did well when they are otherwise desperate
for a little bit of extra wealth, and that it did badly when they do not particularly value
extra wealth. Thus, investors want assets whose payoﬀs have a positive covariance with
hunger, and they will avoid assets with a negative covariance. Investors will drive up the
prices and drive down the average returns of assets that covary positively with hunger, and
vice versa, generating the observed risk premia.
These predictions are surprising to newcomers for what they do not say. More volatile
assets do not necessarily generate a higher risk premium. The variance of the return Rei or
payoﬀ xi is irrelevant per se and does not measure risk or generate a risk premium. Only
the covariance of the return with “hunger” matters.
Also, many people do not recognize that equations (2) and (3) characterize an equilibrium.
They describe a market after everyone has settled on their optimal portfolios. They do not
generate portfolio advice. Deviations from (2) and (3), if you can ﬁnd them, can give
portfolio advice. It’s natural to think that high expected return assets are “good” and one
should buy more of them. But the logic goes the other way: “Good” assets pay oﬀ well in
bad times when investors are hungry. Since investors all want them, those assets get lower
average returns and command higher prices in equilibrium. High average return assets are
forced to pay those returns, or equivalently to suﬀer low prices, because they are so “bad” —
because they pay oﬀ badly precisely when investors are most hungry. In the end, there is
no “good” or “bad.” Equations (2) and (3) describe an equilibrium in which the quality of
the asset and its price are exactly balanced.
To make these ideas operational, we need some procedure to measure the growth in
the marginal value of wealth or “hunger” mt+1. The traditional theories of ﬁnance, CAPM,
ICAPM, and APT, measure hunger by the behavior of large portfolios of assets. For example,
in the CAPM a high average return is balanced by a large tendency of an asset to fall just








where γ is a constant of proportionality equal to the average investor’s risk aversion. Mul-
tifactor models such as the popular Fama-French (1996) three-factor model use returns on
multiple portfolios to measure the marginal value of wealth.
2mt+1 really measures the growth in marginal utility or “hunger.” However, from the perspective of time
t, VW(t)i sﬁxed, so what counts is how the realization of the return covaries with the realization of time
t + 1 marginal value of wealth VW(t +1 ) .
2Research connecting ﬁnancial markets to the real economy — the subject of this survey
— goes one step deeper. It asks what are the fundamental, economic determinants of the












which states that assets must oﬀer high returns if they pay oﬀ badly in “bad times” as
measured by consumption growth. As we will see, this simple and attractive model does not
(yet) work very well. The research in this survey is aimed at improving that performance. It
aims to ﬁnd better measures of the marginal value of wealth, rooted in measures of economic
conditions such as aggregate consumption, that explain the pattern by which mean returns
Et(Rei
t+1) vary across assets i and over time t.
Who cares?
Why is this important? What do we learn by connecting asset returns to macroeconomic
events in this way? Why bother, given that “reduced form” or portfolio-based models like
the CAPM are guaranteed to perform better?
Macroeconomics
Understanding the marginal value of wealth that drives asset markets is most obviously
important for macroeconomics. The centerpieces of dynamic macroeconomics are the equa-
tion of savings to investment, the equation of marginal rates of substitution to marginal
rates of transformation, and the allocation of consumption and investment across time and
states of nature. Asset markets are the mechanism that does all this equating. If we can
learn the marginal value of wealth from asset markets, we have a powerful measurement of
the key ingredient of all modern, dynamic, intertemporal macroeconomics.
In fact, the ﬁr s ts t a ba tt h i sp i e c eo fe c o n o m i c si sad i s a s t e r ,i naw a yﬁrst made precise
by the “equity premium” puzzle. The marginal value of wealth needed to make sense of the
most basic stock market facts is orders of magnitude more volatile than that speciﬁed in
almost all macroeconomic models. Clearly, ﬁnance has a lot to say about macroeconomics,
and it says that something is desperately wrong with most macroeconomic models.
In response to this challenge, many macroeconomists simply dismiss asset market data.
“Something’s wacky with stocks” they say, or perhaps “stocks are driven by fads and fashions
disconnected from the real economy.” That might be true, but if so, by what magic are
marginal rates of substitution and transformation equated? It makes no sense to say “markets
are crazy” and then go right back to market-clearing models with wildly counterfactual asset-
pricing implications. If asset markets are screwed up, so is the equation of marginal rates
of substitution and transformation in every macroeconomic model, so are those models’
predictions for quantities, and so are their policy and welfare implications.
3Finance
Many ﬁnancial economists return the compliment, and dismiss macroeconomic approaches
to asset pricing because portfolio-based models “work better” — they provide smaller pricing
errors. This dismissal of macroeconomics by ﬁnancial economists is just as misguided as
the dismissal of ﬁnance by macroeconomists.
First, a good part of the better performance of portfolio-based models simply reﬂects
Roll’s (1977) theorem: We can always construct a reference portfolio that perfectly ﬁts all
asset returns: the sample mean-variance eﬃcient portfolio. The only content to empirical
work in asset pricing is what constraints the author put on his ﬁshing expedition to avoid
rediscovering Roll’s theorem. The instability of many “anomalies” and the ever-changing
nature of factor models that “explain” them (Schwert 2003) lends some credence to this
worry.
The main ﬁshing constraint one can imagine is that the factor portfolios are in fact
mimicking portfolios for some well-understood macroeconomic risk. Fama (1991) famously
labeled the ICAPM and similar theories “ﬁshing licenses,” but his comment cuts in both di-
rections. Yes, current empirical implementations do not impose much structure from theory,
but no, you still can’t ﬁsh without a license. For example, momentum has yet to acquire the
status of a factor despite abundant empirical success, because it has been hard to come up
with stories that it corresponds to some plausible measure of the marginal utility of wealth.
Second, much work in ﬁnance is framed as answering the question whether markets are
“rational” and “eﬃcient” or not. No amount of research using portfolios on the right hand
side can ever address this question. The only possible content to the “rationality” question
is whether the “hunger” apparent in asset prices — the discount factor, marginal value of
wealth, etc. — mirrors macroeconomic conditions correctly. If Mars has perfectly smooth
consumption growth, then prices that are perfectly “rational” on volatile Earth would be
“irrational” on Mars. Price data alone cannot answer the question, because you can’t tell
from the prices which planet you’re on.
In sum, the program of understanding the real, macroeconomic risks that drive asset
prices (or the proof that they do not do so at all) is not some weird branch of ﬁnance; it is
the trunk of the tree. As frustratingly slow as progress is, this is the only way to answer the
central questions of ﬁnancial economics, and a crucial and unavoidable set of uncomfortable
measurements and predictions for macroeconomics.
The mimicking portfolio theorem and the division of labor
Portfolio-based models will always be with us. The “mimicking portfolio” theorem states
that if we have the perfect model of the marginal utility of wealth, then a portfolio formed
by its regression on to asset returns will work just as well3. And this “mimicking portfolio”
3Start with the true model,
1=E(mR)
where R denotes a vector of returns. Consider a regression of the discount factor on the returns, with no
4will have better-measured and more frequent data, so it will work better in sample and in
practice. It will be the right model to recommend for many applications.
This theorem is important for doing and evaluating empirical work. First, together with
the Roll theorem, it warns us that it is pointless to engage in an alpha contest between real
and portfolio-based models. Ad-hoc portfolio models must always win this contest — even
the true model would be beat by its own mimicking portfolio because of measurement issues,
and it would be beaten badly by an ad-hoc portfolio model that could slide a bit towards
the sample mean-variance frontier. Thus the game “see if macro factors do better than the
Fama French three factor model” in pricing the Fama French 25 portfolios is rather pointless.
Even if you do succeed, a “small-growth/large-value” fourth factor or the increasingly popular
momentum factor can always come back to trump any alpha successes.
Portfolio-based models are good for relative pricing; for describing one set of asset returns
given another set. The CAPM describes average returns of stock portfolios given the market
premium. The Fama French model describes average returns of 25 size and book/market
sorted portfolios given the average returns of the three factor portfolios. But why is the
average market return what it is? Why are the average returns of the Fama-French value
and size portfolios what they are? Why does the expected market return vary over time? By
their nature, portfolio models cannot answer these questions. Macroeconomic models are
the only way to answer these questions.
With this insight, we can achieve a satisfying division of labor, rather than a fruitless
alpha-ﬁshing contest. Portfolio models document whether expected returns of a large num-
ber of assets or dynamic strategies can be described in terms of a few sources of common
movement. Macro models try to understand why the common factors (market, hml, smb)
are priced. Such an understanding will of course ultimately pay oﬀ for pure portfolio ques-
tions, by helping us to understand which apparent risk premia are stable rewards for risk,
and which were chimeric features of the luck in one particular sample.
2 Facts: Time-variation and business cycle correlation
of expected returns
We start with the facts. What is the pattern by which expected returns vary over time and
across assets? What is the variation on the left hand side of (3) that we want to explain by
understanding the marginal value of wealth on the right hand side of (3)?
constant,
m = b0R + ε.
By construction, E(Rε)=0 ,s o
0=E [(b0R)R]
Therefore, the payoﬀ b0R is a discount factor as well.
5Variation over time
First, a number of variables forecast aggregate stock, bond, and foreign exchange returns.
Thus, expected returns vary over time. The central technique is simple forecasting regression:
If we ﬁnd |b| > 0i nRt+1 = a + bxt + εt+1, then we know that Et(Rt+1)v a r i e so v e rt i m e .
The forecasting variables xt typically have a suggestive business cycle correlation. Expected
returns are high in “bad times,” when we might well suppose people are less willing to hold
risks.
For example, Table 1 reports regressions of excess returns on dividend-price ratios. A
one percentage point higher dividend yield leads to a four percentage point higher return.
This is a surprisingly large number. If there were no price adjustment, a one percentage
point higher dividend yield would only lead to a one percentage point higher return. The
conventional “random walk” view implies a price adjustment that takes this return away.
Apparently, prices adjust in the “wrong” direction, reinforcing the higher dividend yield.
Since the right hand variable (dividend-price ratio) is very persistent, long-horizon forecasts
are even more dramatic, with larger coeﬃcients and R2 values.
The second set of regressions in Table 1 is just as surprising. A high dividend yield means
a “low” price, and it should signal a decline in future dividends. We see tiny and completely
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients, and tiny R2 values. Apparently, variation in price-dividend ratios
does not come from news about future dividends.
Horizon kR e
t→t+k = a + bDt
Pt + εt+k
Dt+k
Dt = a + bDt
Pt + εt+k
(years) b t(b) R2 b t(b) R2
1 4.0 2.7 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.0001
2 7.9 3.0 0.12 -0.42 -0.22 0.001
3 12.6 3.0 0.20 0.16 0.13 0.0001
5 20.6 2.6 0.22 2.42 1.11 0.02
Table 1. OLS regressions of excess returns (value weighted NYSE - treasury
bill) and real dividend growth on the value weighted NYSE dividend-price ratio.
Sample 1927-2005, annual data. Re
t→t+k denotes the total excess return from
time t to time t+k. Standard errors use GMM (Hansen-Hodrick) to correct for
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
This pattern is not unique to stocks. Bond and foreign exchange returns are also pre-
dictable, meaning that expected returns vary through time. The same pattern holds in each
case: a “yield” or “yield spread” (dividend yield, bond yields, international interest rate dif-
ferential) forecasts excess returns, it does so because something that should be forecastable
to oﬀs e tt h ev a r i a t i o ni ne x p e c t e dr e t u r n s( d i v i d end growth, short-term interest rates, ex-
change rates) does not move, or does not move quickly enough; and the high-expected return
signal (high dividend yield, upward sloping yield curve, low interest rates relative to foreign)
typically comes in bad macroeconomic times. A large number of additional variables also
forecast returns.
6Variation across assets
Second, expected returns vary across assets. Stocks earn more than bonds of course. In
addition, a large number of stock characteristics are now associated with average returns.
The book/market ratio is the most famous example: stocks with low prices (market value)
relative to book value seem to provide higher subsequent average returns. A long list of other
variables including size (market value), sales growth, past returns, past volume, accounting
ratios, short-sale restrictions, and corporate actions such as investment, equity issuance
and repurchases are also associated with average returns going forward. We can think of all
these phenomena as similar regression forecasts applied to individual assets or characteristic-






t = a + bxit + εit.
This variation in expected returns across assets would not cause any trouble for traditional
ﬁnance theory, if the characteristics associated with high average returns were also associated
with large market betas. Alas, they often are not. Instead, the empirical ﬁnance literature
has associated these patterns in expected returns with betas on new “factors.”
(Cochrane (1999a) is an easily accessible review paper that synthesizes current research on
both the time-series and the cross-sectional issues. Chapter 20 of Asset Pricing, Cochrane
2004 is a somewhat expanded version, with more emphasis on the relationship between
various time series representations. Campbell 2003 also has a nice summary of the facts. )
2.1 Return forecasts — variation over time
Return forecasts have a long history. The classic view that “stocks follow a random walk,”
meaning that the expected return is constant over time, was ﬁr s tc h a l l e n g e di nt h el a t e
1970s. Fama and Schwert (1977) found that expected stock returns did not increase one-
for-one with inﬂation. They interpreted this result to say that expected returns are higher
in bad economic times, since people are less willing to hold risky assets, and lower in good
times. Inﬂation is lower in bad times and higher in good times, so lower expected returns in
times of high inﬂation are not a result of inﬂation, but a coincidence.
To us, the association with inﬂation that motivated Fama and Schwert is less interesting,
but the core ﬁnding that expected returns vary over time, and are correlated with business
cycles, (high in bad times, low in good times) remains the central fact. Fama and Gibbons
(1982) added investment to the economic modeling, presaging the investment and equilibrium
models we study later.
I nt h ee a r l y1 9 8 0 s ,w el e a r n e dt h a tb o n da n df o r e i g ne x c h a n g ee x p e c t e de x c e s sr e t u r n s
vary over time — that the classic “expectations hypothesis” is false. Hansen and Hodrick
(1980) and Fama (1984a) documented the predictability of foreign-exchange returns by run-
ning regressions of those returns on forward-spot spread or interest rate diﬀerentials across
7countries. If the foreign interest rate is unusually higher than the domestic interest rate, it
turns out that the foreign currency does not tend to depreciate and thus an adverse cur-
rency movement does not, on average, wipe out the apparently attractive return to investing
abroad. (“Unusually” is an important qualiﬁer. If you just invest in high interest rate coun-
tries, you end up investing in high inﬂation countries, and depreciation does wipe out any
gains. The phenomenon requires you to invest in countries with a higher-than-usual interest
rate spread, i.e. following a regression of returns on interest rate spreads over time, with a
constant. What “usual” means, i.e. the fact of an estimated constant in these regressions,
is still a bit of an open question.)
Fama (1984b) documented the predictability of short-term bond returns, and Fama and
Bliss (1987) the predictability of long-term bond returns, by running regressions of bond
returns on forward-spot spreads or yield diﬀerentials. Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz
(1983) and Campbell and Shiller (1991) analogously rejected the expectations hypothesis by
regressions of future yields on current yields; their regressions imply time-varying expected
returns. Campbell (1995) is an excellent summary of this line of research.
While the expectations hypothesis had been rejected before,4 these papers focused a lot of
attention on the problem. In part, they did so by applying a simple and easily-interpretable
regression methodology rather than more indirect tests: just forecast tomorrow’s excess re-
turns from today’s yields or other forecasting variables. They also regressed changes in prices
(returns) or yields on today’s yield or forward-rate spreads. The expectations hypothesis
looks pretty good if you just regress (say) the ex-post spot rate on the ex-ante forward rate
to test the prediction that the forward rate is equal to the expected spot rate. But this is not
a very powerful test. For example, if you forecast tomorrow’s temperature by just quoting
today’s temperature, you will also get a nice 1.0 coeﬃcient and a high R2, as overall temper-
ature varies over the year. To see a good weather forecaster, you have to check whether he
can predict the diﬀerence of tomorrow’s temperature over today’s temperature. Similarly,
we see the failure of the expectations hypothesis by seeing that the diﬀerence between the
forward rate and this year’s spot rate does not forecast a change i nt h es p o tr a t ef r o mt h i s
year to next year. Finally, when looked at this way, these papers showed the striking magni-
tude and character of expectations-hypothesis failures. If the forward rate is one percentage
point higher than the spot rate, Fama and Bliss showed that expected returns rise by more
than a full percentage point, and the one year short rate forecast does not change at all.
Foreign exchange forecasts are even larger: a one percentage point interest diﬀerential seems
to signal an increase in expected returns larger than one percentage point.
The latter ﬁndings in particular have been extended and stand up well over time. Stam-
baugh (1988) extended the results for short term bonds and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005)
4Evidence against the expectations hypothesis of bond yields goes back at least to Macaulay (1938).
Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz generously say that the expectations hypothesis has been “rejected many
times in careful econometric studies,” citing Hansen and Sargent (1981), Roll (1970), Sargent (1978), (1972),
and Shiller (1979). Fama says that “The existing literature generally ﬁnds that forward rates...are poor
forecasts of future spot rates,” and cites Hamburger and Platt (1975), Fama (1976), and Shiller, Campbell
and Shoenholtz.
8did so for long term bonds. Both papers ran bond returns from t to t +1o nall forward
rates available at time t, and substantially raised the forecast R2. The Cochrane and Pi-
azzesi bond return forecasting variable also improves on the yield spread’s ability to forecast
stock returns, and we emphasize that a single “factor” seems to forecast bond returns for all
maturities.
During this period, we also accumulated direct regression evidence that expected excess
returns vary over time for the stock market as a whole. Rozeﬀ (1984), Shiller (1984), Keim
and Stambaugh (1986), Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Fama and French (1988b) showed
that dividend/price ratios forecast stock market returns. Fama and French really dramatized
the importance of the D/P eﬀect by emphasizing long horizons, at which the R2 rise to 60%.
(The lower R2 values in Table 1 reﬂect my use of both the pre-1947 and post-1988 data.)
This observation emphasized that stock return forecastability is an economically interesting
phenomenon that cannot be dismissed as another little anomaly that might be buried in
transactions costs. Long horizon forecastability is not really a distinct phenomenon; it arises
mechanically as the result of a small short horizon variability and a slow-moving right hand
variable (D/P). It also does not generate much statistical news since standard errors grow
with horizon just as fast as coeﬃcients, as you can see by the t statistics in Table 1.
Fama and French (1989) is an excellent summary and example of the large body of work
that documents variation of expected returns over time. This paper shows how dividend-
price ratios term spreads (long bond yield less short bond yield) and default spreads forecast
stock and bond returns. The paper emphasizes the comforting link between stock and bond
markets: the term spread forecasts stock returns much as it forecasts bond returns.
If returns are predictable from variables such as dividend yields, it stands to reason
that returns should also be predictable from past returns. The may way the dividend yield
changes after all is by having a good sequence of returns so dividends are divided by a larger
price. Such “mean-reversion” in returns has the powerful implication that the variance of
returns grows less than linearly with horizon, so stocks really are “safer in the long run.”
Initially, this did seem to be the case. Poterba and Summers (1988) and Fama and French
(1988a) documented that past stock market returns forecast subsequent returns at long hori-
zons. However, this eﬀect seems to have vanished, and the current consensus is that although
variables such as dividend yields forecast returns, there is no univariate forecastability or
mean-reversion (see, for example Cochrane 2004 p. 413-415). This is not a logical con-
tradiction. For example the weather can be i.i.d. and thus not forecastable from its own
past, yet still may be forecastable the day ahead by meteorologists who look at more data
than past weather. Similarly, stock returns can be forecastable by other variables such as
dividend yields, yet unforecastable by their own past.
A related literature including Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Cochrane (1991a) (sum-
marized in Cochrane 1999) connects the time-series predictability of stock returns to stock
price volatility. Linearizing and iterating the identity 1 = R
−1
t+1Rt+1 w ec a no b t a i na ni d e n t i t y
9that looks a lot like a present value model,




j+1 [Et(∆dt+j) − Et (rt+j)] + lim
j→∞
ρ
j (pt+j − dt+j)( 4 )
where small letters are logs of capital letters, and k and ρ =( P/D)/[1 + (P/D)] ≈ 0.96 are
constants related to the point P/D about which we linearize. If price-dividend ratios vary
at all, then, then either 1) price-dividend ratios forecast dividend growth 2) price-dividend
ratios forecast returns or 3) prices must follow a “bubble” in which the price-dividend ratio
is expected to rise without bound.
It would be lovely if variation in price-dividend ratios corresponded to dividend forecasts.
Investors, knowing future dividends will be higher than they are today, bid up stock prices
relative to current dividends; then the high price-dividend ratio forecasts the subsequent rise
in dividends. It turns out that price dividend ratios do not forecast aggregate dividends at
all, as shown in the right hand panel of Table 1. This is the “excess volatility” found by
Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981). However, prices can also be high if this is
a time of temporarily low expected returns; then the same dividends are discounted at a
lower rate, and a high price-dividend ratio forecasts low returns. It turns out that the return
forecastability we see in regressions such as the left hand side of Table 1 is just enough to
completely account for the volatility of price dividend ratios through (4). (This is a main
point of Cochrane 1991a.) Thus, return forecastability and “excess volatility” are exactly the
same phenomenon. Since price-dividend ratios are stationary (Craine 1993) and since the
return forecastability does neatly account for price-dividend volatility, we do not need to
invoke the last “rational bubble” term.
Alas, the fact that almost all stock price movements are due to changing expected excess
returns rather than to changing expectations of future dividend growth means that we have
to tie stock market movements to the macroeconomy entirely through harder-to-measure
time-varying risk premia rather than easier-to-understand cashﬂows.
Macro variables and forecastability
The forecasting variables in return regressions are so far all based on market prices,
though, which seems to take us away from our macroeconomic quest. However, as emphasized
by Fama and French (1989) with a nice series of plots, the prices that forecast returns are
correlated with business cycles, with higher expected returns in bad times. A number of
authors including Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and more recently Ang, Piazzesi and
Wei (2004) documented that the price variables that forecast returns also forecast economic
activity.
One can of course run regressions of returns on macroeconomic variables, and a number of
other macroeconomic variables forecast stock returns, including the investment/capital ratio
(Cochrane 1991b), the dividend-earnings ratio (Lamont 1998), investment plans (Lamont
2000), the ratio of labor income to total income (Menzly, Santos and Veronesi 2004), the
ratio of housing to total consumption (Piazzesi Schneider and Tuzel 2005), and an “output
10gap” formed from the Federal Reserve capacity index (Cooper and Priestley 2005), and
the ratio of consumption to wealth (Lettau and Ludvigson 2001a). The investment/capital
ratio and consumption/wealth ratios are particularly attractive variables. The Q theory of
investment says that ﬁrms will invest more when expected returns are low; the investment
to capital regressions verify this fact. Similarly, optimal consumption out of wealth is
smaller when expected returns are larger. In this way, both variables exploit agents quantity
decisions to learn their expectations, and exploit natural cointegrating vectors to measure
long-term forecasts. For example, Cochrane (1994) showed that consumption provides a
natural “trend” for income, and so we see long-run mean reversion in income most easily
by watching the consumption-income ratio. I also showed that dividends provide a natural
“trend” for stock prices, so we see long-run mean-reversion in stock prices most easily by
watching the dividend/price ratio. Lettau and Ludvigson nicely put the two pieces together,
showing how consumption relative to income and wealth has a cross-over prediction for long
run stock returns.
Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) show that the consumption-wealth ratio also forecasts div-
idend growth. This is initially surprising. So far, very little has forecast dividend growth.
And if anything does forecast dividend growth, why is a high dividend forecast not reﬂected
in and hence forecast by higher prices? Lettau and Ludvigson answer this puzzle by not-
ing that the consumption-wealth ratio forecasts returns, even in the presence of D/P. In
the context of (4), the consumption-wealth ratio sends dividend growth and returns in the
same direction, so its eﬀects on the price/dividend ratio oﬀset. Thus, on second thought,
the observation is natural. If anything forecasts dividend growth it must also forecast re-
turns to account for the fact that price/dividend ratios do not forecast dividend growth.
Conversely, if anything has additional explanatory power for returns, it must also forecast
dividend growth. And it makes sense. In the bottom of a recession, both returns and
dividend growth will be strong as we come out of the recession. So we end up with a new
variable, and an opening for additional variables, that forecast both returns and cashﬂows,
giving stronger links from macroeconomics to ﬁnance.
Statistics
Return forecastability has come with a long statistical controversy. The ﬁrst round of
statistical investigation asked whether the initially impressive long-horizon regressions (the
extra rows of Table 1) capture any information not present in one-period regressions (The
ﬁrst row). Given the large persistence of the dividend yield and related forecasting variables,
the answer is that, by and large, they do not.
Hodrick (1992) put the point nicely: the multiyear regression amounts to a test of the
moment E [(rt+1 + rt+2)xt]=0w h e r ex is the forecasting variable and r are log returns. But
this is the same moment as a one year regression using a moving average right hand variable,
E [rt+1(xt + xt−1)]. Given the extreme persistence of the right hand variables such as divi-
dend yield, one can naturally see that this moment is no more powerful than E(rt+1xt)=0
— none would think that lags of the dividend yield have much marginal forecast power.
Campbell and Shiller (1988) also make this point by emphasizing that multiyear regres-
11sions are implied by one year regressions. If
xt+1 = φxt + vt+1
rt+1 = bxt + εt+1
then
rt+1 + rt+2 = b(1 + φ)xt +( εt+1 + bvt+1 + εt+2).
All of the information in multiyear regressions can be recovered from one year regressions,
which is what maximum likelihood would have you look at anyway. Additional important
contributions include
More seriously, the t statistics in Table 1 are already not that large given the long time
span. In addition, the dividend yield is very persistent, and innovations in returns are
highly correlated with innovations in dividend yields, since a change in prices moves both
variables. As a result, the return-forecasting coeﬃcient inherits near-unit-root properties of
the dividend yield. It is biased upward, and its t-statistic is biased towards rejection. Other
forecasting variables have similar characteristics. Perhaps even the forecastability as seen in
the ﬁrst row is really not there in the ﬁrst place. Following this idea, Goetzmann and Jorion
(1993) and Nelson and Kim (1993) ﬁnd the distribution of the return-forecasting coeﬃcient
by simulation, and ﬁnd greatly reduced evidence for return forecastability. Stambaugh
(1999) derives the ﬁnite-sample properties of the return-forecasting regression, showing the
bias in the return forecast coeﬃcient and the standard errors, and shows that the apparent
forecastability disappears once one takes account of the biases. More recently, Goyal and
Welch (2003, 2005) show that return forecasts based on dividend yields and a menagerie of
other variables do not work out of sample. They compare forecasts in which one estimates the
regression using data up to time t to forecast returns at t+1 with forecasts using the sample
mean in the same period. They ﬁnd that the sample mean produces a better out-of-sample
prediction than do the return-forecasting regressions.
Does this mean we should abandon forecastability and go back to the random walk, i.i.d.
return view of the world? I think not, since there is still not a shred of evidence that price
ratios forecast dividend (or earning or cashﬂow) growth. If prices vary, they must forecast
something — we cannot hold the view that both returns and dividend growth are i.i.d., since
in that case price dividend ratios will be constant. Thus the lack of dividend forecastability
is important evidence for return forecastability, and this is ignored in the statistical studies.
Cochrane (2006b) formalizes this argument and shows that return forecastability is still
highly signiﬁcant, including small-sample biases, when one takes into account both pieces of
evidence. (The paper also contains a more complete bibliography on this statistical issue.)
2.2 The cross-section of returns — variation across assets
Fama and French (1996) is an excellent crystallization of how average returns vary across
stocks. Fama and French start by summarizing for us the “size” and “value” eﬀects; the
fact that small stocks and stocks with low market values relative to book values tend to have
12higher average returns than other stocks.5 See the average returns in their Table 1 panel A,
reproduced below.
Again, this pattern is not by itself a puzzle. High expected returns should be revealed by
low market values (see Equation (4)). The puzzle is that the value and small ﬁrms do not
have higher market betas. As panel B of Fama and French’s Table 1 shows, all of the market
betas are about one. Market betas vary across portfolios a little more in single regressions
without hml and smb as additional right hand variables, but here the result is worse: the
high average return “value” portfolios have lower market betas.
Fama and French then explain the variation in mean returns across the 25 portfolios by
variation in regression slope coeﬃcients on two new “factors,” the hml portfolio of value
minus growth ﬁrms and the smb portfolio of small minus large ﬁrms. Looking across the
rest of their Table 1, you see regression coeﬃcients b,s,h rising in Panel B where expected
returns rise in Panel A. Replacing the CAPM with this “three-factor model” is the central
point of Fama and French’s paper. (Keep in mind, the point of the factor model is to explain
the variation in average returns across the 25 portfolios. The fact that the factors “explain”
a large part of the return variance — the high R2 in the time-series regressions of Table 1 —
is not the central success of an asset pricing model.)
This argument is not as circular as it sounds. Fama and French say that value stocks earn
more than growth stocks not because they are value stocks (a characteristic) but because
they all move with a common risk factor. This comovement is not automatic. For example,
if we split stocks into 26 portfolios based on the ﬁrst letter of the ticker symbol and subtracted
the market return, we would not expect to see a 95% R2 in a regression of the A portfolio on
an A-L minus M-Z “factor,” because we would expect no common movement between the
A, B, C, etc. portfolios.
Stocks with high average returns should move together. Otherwise, one could build a
diversiﬁed portfolio of high expected return (value) stocks, short a portfolio of low expected
return (growth) stocks and make huge proﬁts with no risk. This strategy remains risky and
does not attract massive capital, which would wipe out the anomaly, precisely because there
is a common component to value stocks, captured by the Fama-French hml factor.
Fama and French go further, showing that thes i z ea n db o o kt om a r k e tf a c t o r se x p l a i n
average returns formed by other characteristics. Sales growth is an impressive example,
since it is a completely non-ﬁnancial variable. Stocks with high past sales growth have lower
subsequent returns (“too high prices”) than stocks with low sales growth. They do not have
higher market betas, but they do have higher betas on the Fama-French factors. In this sense,
the Fama French 3 factor model “explains” this additional pattern in expected returns. In
this kind of application, the Fama-French 3 factor model has become the standard model
replacing the CAPM for risk adjusting returns.
The Fama-French paper has also, for better or worse, deﬁned the methodology for evaluat-
5These expected-return ﬁndings go back a long way, including Ball (1978), Basu (1983), Banz (1981),
DeBondt and Thaler (1985), and Fama and French (1992), (1993).
13Figure 1: Fama and French (1996) Table 1
ing asset pricing models for the last 10 years. A generation of papers studies the Fama-French
25 size and book to market portfolios to see whether alternative factor models can explain
their average returns. Empirical papers now routinely form portfolios by sorting on other
characteristics, and then run time-series regressions like Fama and French’s to see which
factors explain the spread in average returns, as revealed by small regression intercepts.
Most importantly, where in the 1980s papers would focus entirely on the probability
value of some overall statistic, Fama and French rightly got people to focus on the spread in
average returns, the spread in betas, and the economic size of the pricing errors. Remarkably,
this, the most successful model since the CAPM, is decisively rejected by formal tests. Fama
14Figure 2: Fama and French (1996) Table 1 continued.
and French taught us to pay attention to more important things than test statistics.
Macro modelers have gotten into the habit of evaluating models on the Fama-French 25
portfolios, just as Fama and French did. I think that in retrospect, this is a misreading of
the point of Fama and French’s paper. The central point of the paper is that all of the
important cross-sectional information in the 25 portfolios is captured by the three factor
portfolios. This is true both of returns and expected returns. One could state the result
that there are three dominant eigenvalues in the covariance matrix of the 25 portfolios, that
explain the vast majority of the correlation structure of the portfolios, and expected returns
are almost completely described by betas on these three portfolios.
15To the extent that the Fama-French three-factor model is successful in describing average
returns, macro-modelers need only worry about why the value (hml) and small-large (smb)
portfolio have expected returns. Given these factors, the expected returns of the 25 portfolios
(and any other portfolios that are explained by the three-factor model) follow automatically.
The point of the 25 portfolios is to show “nonparametrically” that the three factor portfolios
account for all information in stocks sorted by size and book to market. The point of the 25
portfolios is not to generate a good set of portfolios that captures 25 degrees of freedom in
the cross section of all stocks. There are really not 25 degrees of freedom in the Fama-French
portfolios, there are 3 degrees of freedom. This is very bad news for models that explain
the Fama-French portfolios with 4,5, and sometimes 10 factors! This is the central point of
Daniel and Titman (2005) and Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2006).
The Fama-French model is rejected in the 25 portfolios, however. The rejection of the
three-factor model in the 25 portfolios is caused primarily by small growth portfolios, and
Fama and French’s Table 1 shows the pattern. Small growth stocks earn about the same
average returns as large growth portfolios — see Table 1 “means” left column — but they have
much larger slopes s. A larger slope that does not correspond to a larger average return
generates a pricing error a. In addition, the R2 are so large in these regressions, and the
residuals correspondingly so small, that economically small pricing errors are statistically
signiﬁcant. α0Σ−1α is large if α is small, but Σ is even smaller. A fourth “small growth -
large value” factor eliminates this pricing error as well, but I don’t think Fama and French
take the anomaly that seriously.
For the division of labor and the use of 25 portfolios, however, this fact means that models
which improve on the Fama-French factors in the 25 Fama-French portfolios do so by better
pricing the small-growth puzzle and other very small discrepancies of the model. One must
ask whether those discrepancies are at all meaningful.
The Fama-French model seems to take us away from economic explanation of risk premia.
After all, hml and smb are just other portfolios of stocks. Fama and French speculate
suggestively on the macroeconomic foundations of the value premium (p. 77):
One possible explanation is linked to human capital, an important asset for
most investors. Consider an investor with specialized human capital tied to a
growth ﬁrm (or industry or technology). A negative shock to the ﬁrm’s prospects
probably does not reduce the value of the investor’s human capital; it may just
mean that employment in the ﬁrm will expand less rapidly. In contrast, a negative
shock to a distressed ﬁrm more likely implies a negative shock to the value of
specialized human capital since employment in the ﬁrm is more likely to contract.
Thus, workers with specialized human capital in distressed ﬁrms have an incentive
to avoid holding their ﬁrms’ stocks. If variation in distress is correlated across
ﬁrms, workers in distressed ﬁrms have an incentive to avoid the stocks of all
distressed ﬁrms. The result can be a state-variable risk premium in the expected
returns of distressed stocks.
16Much of the work described below tries to formalize this kind of intuition and measure
the required correlations in the data.
A large body of empirical research asks whether the size and book to market factors do
in fact represent macroeconomic phenomena via rather a-structural methods. It is natural
to suppose that value stocks — stocks with low prices relative to book value, thus stocks
that have suﬀered a sequence of terrible shocks — should be more sensitive to recessions
and “distress” than other stocks, and that the value premium should naturally emerge as
a result. Initially, however, eﬀorts to link value stocks and value premia to economic or
ﬁnancial trouble did not bring much success. Fama and French (1997a, 1997b) were able to
link value eﬀects to individual cash ﬂows and “distress,” but getting a premium requires a
link to aggregate bad times, a link that Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) did not ﬁnd.
However, in the 1990s and early 2000s, value stocks have moved much more closely with
the aggregate economy, so more recent estimates do show a signiﬁcant and heartening link
between value returns and macroeconomic conditions. In this context, Liew and Vassalou
(2000) show that Fama and French’s size and book to market factors forecast output growth,
and thus are “business cycle” variables.
The Fama-French paper closes with a puzzle. Though the three-factor model captures
the expected returns from many portfolio sorts, it fails miserably on momentum. If you form
portfolios of stocks that have gone up in the last year, this portfolio continues to do well
in the next year and vice versa (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, see Fama and French’s Table
VI). Again, this result by itself would not be a puzzle, if the “winner” portfolio had higher
market, smb, or hml betas than the loser portfolios. Alas, (Fama and French Table VII)
the winner portfolio actually has lower slopes than the loser portfolio; winners act, sensibly
enough, like high-price growth stocks that should have low mean returns in the three factor
model. The three factor model is worse than useless at capturing the expected returns of
this “momentum” strategy, just as the CAPM is worse than useless at explaining the average
returns of book-to-market portfolios.
Now, the returns of these 10 momentum-sorted portfolios can b ee x p l a i n e db ya na d -
ditional “momentum factor” umd of winner stocks less loser stocks. You cannot form a
diversiﬁed portfolio of momentum stocks and earn high returns with no risk; a common
component to returns shows up once again. Yet Fama and French did not take the step
of adding this fourth factor, and thus claiming a model that would explain all the known
anomalies of its day.
This reluctance is understandable. First, Fama and French worry (p. 81) whether the
momentum eﬀect is real. They note that the eﬀect is much weaker before 1963, and call for
more out-of-sample veriﬁcation. They may also have worried that the eﬀect would not survive
transactions costs. Exploiting the momentum anomaly requires high frequency trading, and
shorting small losing stocks can be diﬃcult. Equivalently, momentum is, like long-horizon
regression, a way to enhance the economic size of a well-known statistical anomaly, as a tiny
positive autocorrelation of returns can generate the observed momentum proﬁts. Last year’s
1/10 best winners typically have gone up a tremendous amount, often 100% or more. It only
takes a small, 0.1 or less autocorrelation or 0.01 forecasting R2 to turn such past returns to
1710% expected future returns. (See Cochrane 1999 for a more detailed calculation. ) Can
one really realize proﬁts that result from 0.01 forecast R2? Second, having just swallowed
hml and smb, one might naturally be reluctant to add a new factor for every new anomaly,
and to encourage others to do so. Third, and perhaps most importantly, Fama and French
had at least a good story for the macroeconomic underpinnings of size and value eﬀects, as
expressed in the above quotation. They had no idea of a macroeconomic underpinning for a
momentum premium, and in fact in their view (p. 81) there isn’t even a coherent behavioral
story for such a premium. They know that having some story is the only “ﬁshing license”
that keeps one from rediscovering the Roll theorem. Still, they acknowledge (p. 82) that if
the eﬀect survives scrutiny, another “factor” may soon be with us.
In the time since Fama and French wrote, many papers have examined the momentum
eﬀect in great detail. I do not survey that literature here, since it takes us away from
our focus of macroeconomic understanding of premia rather than exploration of the premia
themselves. However, momentum remains an anomaly.
One can begin to imagine macroeconomic stories for momentum. Good cash-ﬂow news
could bring growth-options into the money, and this event could increase the systematic risk
(betas) of the winner stocks. Of course, then a good measure of “systematic risk” and good
measurements of conditional betas should explain the momentum eﬀect.
Momentum is correlated with value, so it’s tempting to extend a macroeconomic inter-
pretation of the value eﬀect to the momentum eﬀect. Alas, the sign is wrong. Last year’s
winners act like growth stocks, but they get high, not low, average returns. Hence, the
component of a momentum factor orthogonal to value must have a very high risk premium,
and its variation is orthogonal to whatever macroeconomic eﬀects underlie value.
In any case, the current crop of papers that try to measure macroeconomic risks follow
Fama and French by trying to explain the value and size premium, or the Fama-French 25
portfolios, and so far largely exclude the momentum eﬀect. The momentum factor is much
more commonly used in performance evaluation applications, following Carhart (1997). In
order to evaluate whether, say, fund managers have stock-picking skill, it does not matter
whether the factor portfolios correspond to real risks or not, and whether the average returns
of the factor portfolios continue out of sample. One only wants to know whether a manager
did better in a sample period than a mechanical strategy.
I suspect that if the momentum eﬀect survives its continued scrutiny, macro-ﬁnance will
add momentum to the list of facts to be explained. A large number of additional expected-
return anomalies have also popped up, which will also make it to the macro-ﬁnance list of
facts if they survive long enough. We are thus likely to face many new “factors.” After all,
each new expected-return sort must either fall in to one of the following categories. 1) A new
expected-return sort might be explained by betas on existing factors, so once you understand
the existing factors you understand the new anomaly, and it adds nothing. This is how, for
example sales growth behaves for the Fama-French model. 2) The new expected-return
sort might correspond to a new dimension of comovement in stock returns, and thus be
“explained” (maybe “summarized” is a betterw o r d )b yan e wf a c t o r .3 )I fan e we x p e c t e d -
18return sort does not fall into 1 and 2, it corresponds to an arbitrage opportunity, which is
most unlikely to be real, and if real to survive longer than a chicken in a crocodile pond.
Thus, any expected return variation that is both real and novel must correspond to a new
“factor.”
3E q u i t y P r e m i u m
With the basic facts in mind, we are ready to see what theories can match the facts; what
speciﬁcations of the marginal utility of wealth VW can link asset prices to macroeconomics.
The most natural starting point is the classic consumption-based asset pricing model.
It states that expected excess returns should be proportional to the covariance of returns
with consumption growth, with risk aversion as the constant of proportionality. If the utility






then the marginal value of wealth is equal to the marginal utility of consumption — a marginal


























This model is a natural ﬁrst place to link asset returns to macroeconomics. It has a
great economic and intuitive appeal. Assets should give a high premium if they pay oﬀ
badly in “bad times.” What better measure of “bad times” than consumption? People may
complain, or seem to be in bad straits, but if they’re going out to fancy dinners you can tell
that times aren’t so bad after all. More formally, consumption subsumes or reveals all we
need to know about wealth, income prospects, etc. in a wide class of models starting with
























The simpler form of Equation (5) results in the continuous-time limit.
19the Permanent Income Hypothesis. In every formal derivation of the CAPM, ICAPM, and
every other factor model (at least all the ones I know of), the marginal utility of consumption
growth is a single factor that should subsume all the others. They are all special cases of
the consumption-based model, not alternatives to it.
The equity premium puzzle points out that this consumption-based model cannot explain
the most basic premium, that of the market portfolio over the risk free rate. (Again, notice in
this exercise the proper role of macro models — the CAPM takes the mean market return as






so, since kρk < 1,
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<γ σ (∆c). (8)
T h el e f th a n ds i d eo f( 8 )i st h e“ S h a r p er a t i o” a common measure of the ratio of reward to
risk in asset markets. In postwar US data, the mean return of stocks over bonds is about
8% with a standard deviation of about 16%, so the Sharpe ratio is about 0.5. Longer
time series and other countries give somewhat lower values, but numbers above 0.2-0.3 are
characteristic of most times and markets. Other investments (such as value stocks or some
dynamic strategies in bond markets) can sometimes give much larger numbers, up to Sharpe
ratios of 1.0.
Aggregate nondurable and services consumption volatility is much smaller, about 1.5%
p e ry e a ri nt h ep o s t w a rU S .T og e tf r o mσ(∆c)=0 .015 to a Sharpe ratio of 0.5 we need a
risk aversion of at least 0.5/0.015 = 33, which seems much larger than most economists ﬁnd
plausible.
One initial reaction is that the problem is not so much high stock average returns but
low interest rates. Perhaps something is wrong with bonds, perhaps traceable to monetary
policy, liquidity, etc. Alas, this solution does not work. The key to the calculation in (8)
is the Sharpe ratio on the left hand side. There are large Sharpe ratios between stocks (as
in the value - growth premium studied by Fama and French) ignoring bonds all together.
High sample Sharpe ratios are pervasive in ﬁnance and not limited to the diﬀerence between
stocks and bonds.
One might simply accept high risk aversion, but the corresponding equation for the risk
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If we accept γ = 33, with about 1% expected consumption growth E(∆c)=0 .01 and
20σ2(∆c)=0 .0152, we predict a risk free rate of
r
f = δ +3 3× 0.01 −
1
2
× 33 × 34 × (0.015
2)
= δ +0 .33 − 0.13
Thus, with δ = 0, the model predicts a 20% interest rate. To generate a (say) 5% interest
rate, we need a negative 15% discount rate δ.W o r s e , ( 9 ) w i t h γ = 33 predicts that the
interest rate will be extraordinarily sensitive to changes in expected consumption growth or
consumption volatility. Therefore, the puzzlei so f t e nk n o w na st h e“ e q u i t yp r e m i u m-r i s k
free rate” puzzle.
T h ep u z z l ei sal o w e rb o u n d ,a n dm o r ei n f o r m ation makes it worse. Among other obser-
vations, we do know something about the correlation of consumption and asset returns, and
we know it is less than one. Using the sample correlation of ρ =0 .2 in postwar quarterly
data, i.e. using (7) or using the sample covariance in (6), raises the required risk aversion by
a factor of 5, to 165! Even using ρ =0 .41, the largest correlation among many consumption
deﬁnitions (you get this with 4th quarter to 4th quarter real chain-weighted nondurable
consumption) the required risk aversion rises to 33/0.41 = 80.
The equity premium puzzle, and the larger failure of the consumption-based model that it
crystallizes, is quantitative,n o tqualitative. The signs are right. The stock market does covary
positively with consumption growth, so the market should give a positive risk premium. The
problem is that the risk premium is quantitatively too large to be explained given sensible
risk aversion and the observed volatility of consumption growth.
Also, the puzzle necessarily unites macroeconomic and ﬁnancial analysis. Finance models
always had consumption hidden in them, and that consumption process had huge volatility.
Consumption is proportional to wealth in the derivation of the CAPM, so the CAPM predicts
that consumption should inherit the large 16% or so volatility of the stock market. You don’t
notice this prediction though unless you ask for the implicit consumption volatility and you
check it against consumption data.







Using an 8% mean and a 16% standard deviation, this calculation predicts 100% equities
(w =1 )a tγ =0 .08/0.162 =3 .125, which seems like a nice sensible risk aversion. (In fact,
this calculation was often cited (mis-cited, in my view) as evidence for low risk aversion.)
The problem with the calculation is that the standard portfolio model also says consumption
should be proportional to wealth, and thus consumption should also have a 16% standard
deviation.
That consumption is so much smoother than wealth remains a deep insight for under-
standing economic dynamics, one whose implications have not been fully explored. For
21example, it implies that one of consumption or wealth must have substantial dynamics. If
wealth increases 16% in a typical 1σ year and consumption moves 2% in the same 1σ year,
either consumption must eventually rise 14% or wealth must eventually decline 14%, as the
consumption/wealth ratio is stable in the long run. This is a powerful motivation for Lettau
and Ludvigson’s use of consumption/wealth as a forecasting variable. It means that time-
varying expected returns, “excess” stock volatility and the equity premium puzzle are all
linked in ways that are still not fully exploited.
Mehra and Prescott and the puzzle
The ink spilled on the equity premium would sink the Titanic, so there is no way here to
do justice to all who contributed to or extendedt h ep u z z l e ,o re v e nt os u m m a r i z et h eh u g e
literature.
My quick overview takes the approach of Cochrane and Hansen’s (1992) review paper
“Asset Pricing Explorations for Macroeconomics.” The fundamental idea there, equation
(8) is due to Shiller (1982) (see p. 221) and much elaborated on by Hansen and Jagannathan
(1991), who also provide many deep insights into the representation of asset prices. Cochrane
and Hansen (1992) discuss the bounds including correlation as above and a large number of
additional extensions. Weil (1989) pointed out the risk free rate part of the puzzle. Chapters
1a n d2 1o fAsset Pricing (Cochrane 2004) gives a review of the equity premium and related
puzzles. Campbell (2003) and Kocherlakota (1996) are also excellent recent reviews.
Mehra and Prescott (1985) is the paper that really brought attention to the equity pre-
mium puzzle. Mehra and Prescott take a diﬀerent approach from my simple synthesis: they
specify an explicit two-state-Markov process for consumption growth, they calculate the
price of the consumption claim and risk free rate, and they point out that the mean stock
excess return calculated in this “calibrated economy” is much too low unless risk aversion is
raised to apparently implausible values (55, in this case).
There is some question who should get credit for discovering the equity premium puzzle.
Grossman and Shiller (1981), published in Grossman, Melino and Shiller (1987) reported that
risk aversion estimates in consumption models seemed strangely high. Hansen and Singleton
(1983) show very high risk aversion estimates coming from unconditional stock and bond
returns, which is the heart of the puzzle. They give credit for the point to Grossman and
Shiller.
It’s interesting that Mehra and Prescott’s more complex approach was so much more
inﬂuential. In retrospect, I think we can see the equity premium puzzle much more clearly
with the simple manipulations of ﬁrst order conditions as above, which is also Shiller’s
(1982) early approach. In part, it seems that Mehra and Prescott were the ﬁrst to realize
the importance of what they found. Grossman and Shiller dismiss their ﬁnding of high risk
aversion as “preliminary,” unbelievable, and probably the spurious result of some puzzling
recent data. They report: “We have some preliminary results on the estimation of A [risk
aversion] and β [discount factor]...Unfortunately, the estimates of A for the more recent
sub-periods seem implausibly high.” They attribute the result to “the divergence between
22P∗ and P since the early 1950’s as well as the extremely low real returns on short-term
bonds in this period. There was an enormous rise in stock prices in that period...” Hansen
and Singleton simply report high risk aversion estimates, but seem to regard them as not
particularly interesting results of ineﬃcient (since they leave out instruments) estimates.
Hansen and Singleton describe the crucial Table 5 thus:
“Consistent with their [Grossman and Shiller’s] results, we found kˆ αk [risk aver-
sion, γ in the above notation] to be very large with a correspondingly large stan-
dard error when NLAG=0. Consistent with our other ﬁndings kˆ αk is approxi-
mately one when the serial correlation in the time-series data is taken into account
in estimation. This shows the extent to which the precision and magnitude of
our estimates rely on the restrictions across the serial correlation parameters of
the respective time series. ”
Mehra and Prescott argue instead that high risk aversion is a robust and unavoidable
feature of any method for matching the model to data, and that the puzzle is important
because it will require fundamental changes in macroeconomic modeling. Compare the
previous quotes to these, from the ﬁrst page of Mehra and Prescott:
“This result is robust to model speciﬁcation and measurement problems.” “The
question addressed in this paper is whether this large diﬀerential in average yields
can be accounted for by models that abstract from transactions costs, liquidity
constraints and other frictions absent in the Arrow-Debreu setup. Our ﬁnding
is that it cannot be, at least not for the class of economies considered. Our
conclusion is that most likely some equilibrium model with a friction will be the
one that successfully accounts for the large average equity premium. ”
In addition, Mehra and Prescott gave a structure that many people found useful for
thinking about variations on the puzzle. A very large number of alternative explicitly calcu-
lated endowment economies followed Mehra and Prescott. The approach I followed above,
playing with simple ﬁrst order conditions, similarly took oﬀ again following Hansen and Ja-
gannathan’s (1991) paper, that gave much more structure to play with than Shiller’s (1982)
simple calculations, though in the end we seem to have come back to that starting point.
In ﬁnance as elsewhere, identifying, marketing and packaging the insight, and leaving a
structure that others can play with, are justly important contributions.
Mehra and Prescott’s general equilibrium modeling imposes extra discipline on this kind
of research, and in many ways is also crucially important as the progenitor of the gen-
eral equilibrium models described below. In a general equilibrium model, the covariance
of consumption with returns is generated endogenously. You can’t just take cov(R,∆c)a s
given and crank up γ (see (6)) to get any premium you want. Thus, seemingly normal
speciﬁcations of the model can generate unexpected results. For example, positive consump-
tion growth autocorrelation and risk aversion greater than one generates a negative equity
23premium because it generates a negative covariance of consumption growth with returns.
Working out a general equilibrium model, one also notices that many other predictions go
awry. For example, Mehra and Prescott’s model does not generate nearly enough return
variance, and measures to increase the equity premium or return variance dramatically and
counterfactually increase the variation in the risk free rate over time. These basic moments
remain quite diﬃcult for general equilibrium models to capture, but you cannot notice they
are a problem if you only look at ﬁrst-order conditions.
My view of the literature is that “explaining the equity premium puzzle” is dying out.
We have several preferences consistent with equity premium and risk free rates, including
habits and Epstein-Zin preferences. These preferences, described in more detail below, break
the link between risk aversion and intertemporal substitution, so there is no connection to
a “risk-free rate” puzzle any more, and we can coherently describe the data with high risk
aversion. No model has yet been able to account for the equity premium with low risk
aversion, and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) oﬀer some reasons why this is unlikely ever to
be achieved. So we may have to accept high risk aversion, at least for reconciling aggregate
consumption with market returns in this style of model.
At the same time, many economists’ beliefs about the size of the equity premium are
declining from the 8% postwar average, past the 6% average in longer samples, down to 2 or
3% or less. The US economy and others with high sample equity premia may simply have
been lucky. Did people in 1947 really think that the stock market would gain 8% per year
more than bonds, and shy away from buying more stocks in the full knowledge of this mean,
because the 16% annual standard deviation of stock returns seemed like too much risk? Or
was the 8% mean return largely a surprise?
Putting the argument a little more formally, we can separate the achieved average stock
return into 1) the initial dividend yield (dividend payment/initial price) 2) increases in
t h ep r i c e / d i v i d e n dr a t i oa n d3 )g r o w t hi nd i v i d e n d s ,g i v i n gg r o w t hi np r i c e sa tt h es a m e
price/dividend ratio. Dividend yields were about 4%, and have declined to about 2%.
Dividend yields are known ahead of time, so cannot contribute to a “surprise” return. The
price/dividend ratio has about doubled in the postwar era, and this increase could well be a
surprise. But this doubling happened over 50 years, contributing only 1.4% (compounded;
21/50 =1 .014) to the equity return. If there is a surprise, then, the surprise is that economic
growth was so strong in the postwar era, resulting in surprisingly strong dividend growth.
(In the long run, all of the return must be dividend growth since price/dividend ratios are
stationary) And of course economic growth was surprisingly good in the postwar era. Most
people in 1947 expected a return to depression.
For these reasons, as well as perhaps simple boredom in the face of intractable questions,
research attention is moving to understanding stock return dynamics and the cross-section,
either ignoring the equity premium or simply allowing high risk aversion to account for it.
One never can tell when a striking new insight will emerge, but I can tell that new twists in
the standard framework are attracting less attention.
244 Consumption models
Really, the most natural thing to do with the consumption-based model is to estimate it
and test it, as one would do for any economic model. Logically, this investigation comes
before “puzzles” which throw away information (correlation, multiple assets, time-variation
of moments). The puzzles are not tests, they are useful diagnostics for why tests fail.
We start here with Hansen and Singleton’s (1982, 1984) classic investigation of the
consumption-based model. Alas, they decisively reject the model; among other things they
ﬁnd “equity premium puzzle” result that the model cannot explain the spread between stock
and bond returns with low interest rates.
The following 20 years have seen an enormous eﬀort aimed at the consumption-based
model. There are of course all sorts of issues to address. What utility function should one
use? How should one treat time aggregation and consumption data? How about multiple
goods? What asset returns and instruments are informative? Asset pricing empirical work
has moved from industry or beta portfolios and lagged returns and consumption growth as
instruments to the use of size, book/market and momentum portfolios, and to the dividend
price ratio, term spreads and other more powerful instruments. How does the consumption-
based model fare against this higher bar?
As I see it, there were 10 years of depressing rejection after rejection, followed by 10 years
of increasing success. This is heartening. At some level, the consumption-based model must
be right if economics is to have any hope of describing stock markets. The data may be poor
enough that practitioners will still choose “reduced form” ﬁnancial models, but economic
understanding of the stock market must be based on the idea that people fear stocks, and
hence do not buy more despite attractive returns, because people fear that stocks will fall
in “bad times.” At some point “bad times” must be mirrored in a decision to cut back on
consumption.
4.1 Hansen and Singleton; power utility
The classic consumption-based model test is due to Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1984). The
inﬂuence of this paper is hard to overstate. It gives a clear exposition of the GMM methodol-
ogy, which has pretty much taken over estimation and testing. (At least it has for me. Asset
Pricing, Cochrane 2004 maps all standard asset pricing estimates into GMM and shows how
they can and should be easily generalized using GMM to account for heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation.) Also with this work (generalizing Hall’s 1978 test for a random walk in
consumption) macroeconomists and ﬁnancial economists realizedt h e yd i dn o tn e e dt ow r i t e
complete models before going to the data; they could examine the ﬁrst-order conditions of
investors without specifying technology, model solution, and a complete set of shocks.














The method is astonishingly simple. Multiply both sides both sides of (10) by instruments
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Then, take sample averages, and search numerically for values of β, γ that make these
“moment conditions” (equivalently, pricing errors) as small as possible. GMM gives a distri-
bution theory for the parameter estimates, and a test statistic based on the idea that these
pricing errors should not be too big.
Hansen and Singleton’s (1984) results provide a useful baseline. If we take a single asset
and multiply it by instruments (Hansen and Singleton’s Table I), we are asking whether
movements in returns predictable by some instrument zt —a si nr e g r e s s i o n so fRt+1 on
zt — are matched by movements in consumption growth or by the product of consumption
growth and returns as predicted by the same instrument. The results give sensible parameter
estimates; small coeﬃcients of risk aversion γ and discount factors less than one. However,
the standard errors on the risk aversion coeﬃcients are pretty large, and the estimates are
not that stable across speciﬁcations.
The problem, or rather the underlying fact, is that Hansen and Singleton’s instruments —
lags of consumption and returns — don’t forecast either consumption growth or returns very
well. Consumption and stock prices are, in fact, pretty close to random walks, especially
when forecast by their own lags. To the extent that these instruments do forecast consump-
tion and returns, they forecast them by about the same amount, leading to risk aversion
coeﬃcients near one.
Simplifying somewhat, consider the linearized risk free rate equation,
r
f
t = δ + γEt (∆ct+1) −
1
2
γ(γ +1 ) σ
2
t(∆ct+1). (12)
If risk premia are not well forecast by these instruments (and they aren’t) and consumption
is homoskedastic (pretty close) then the main thing underlying estimates of (11) with a single
asset and many instruments is whether predictable movements in consumption growth line
up with predictable movements in interest rates. The answer for Hansen and Singleton is
that they do, with a constant of proportionality (γ) near one. (Hansen and Singleton 1983
study this linearized version of the consumption based model, and their Table 4 studies this
interest rate equation explicitly.)
If we take multiple assets, the picture changes however. The middle panel of Hansen and
Singleton’s (1984) Table III uses one stock and one bond return, and a number of instruments.
It ﬁnds small, well measured risk aversion coeﬃcients — but the tests all decisively reject the
26model. Hansen and Singleton (1983) Table 5, reproduced here, makes the story clear.
Consumption degrees of
Model γ∗ β∗ Data Lags χ2† freedom
1 30.58 1.001 Nondurable 0 Just identiﬁed
(34.06) (0.0462)
2 0.205 0.999 Nondurable 4 170.25 24
(0.9999)
3 58.25 1.088 ND &Services 0 Just Identiﬁed
(66.57) (0.0687)
4 0.209 1.000 ND& Services 4 366.22 24
(0.9999)
Estimates of the consumption-based model using the value-weighted NYSE
return and the Treasury bill return. Lags is the number of lags of consumption
growth and returns used as instruments. Source: Hansen and Singleton (1983)
Table 5. * Standard errors in parentheses. †Probability values in parentheses.
If we just use the unconditional moments — no instruments, the “lags = 0” rows — we
ﬁnd a very large value of the risk aversion coeﬃcient. The covariance of consumption growth
with stock returns is small, so it takes a very large risk aversion coeﬃcient to explain the
large mean stock excess return. This ﬁnding is the equity premium in a nutshell. (Using
more recent data and the full nonlinear model, the smallest pricing error occurs around
γ =5 0 ,b u tt h e r ei sno choice of γ that sets the moment to zero, even though the model is
just identiﬁed.) The β slightly greater than one is the risk free rate puzzle. The data are
monthly, so even a β slightly greater than one is puzzling.
If we use instruments as well, in the lags = 4 rows, then the estimate is torn between
a small value of γ to match the roughly one-for-one movement of predicted consumption
growth and returns (using past consumption growth and returns as predictors) and the very
large value of γ necessary to explain the equity premium. Eﬃcient methods weight cries
from diﬀerent parties by their statistical signiﬁcance. Here, the moments corresponding to
predictable movements are better measured, so the estimate of γ is close to those values. But
the test statistic gives a huge rejection, as in Hansen and Singleton (1984). That huge test
statistic tells us that there is a tension over the value of γ.T h ev a l u eo fγ that makes sense
of the equity premium (unconditional returns) is much larger than the value that makes
sense of the conditional moments (forecasted returns vs. consumption growth), so one set of
moments or pricing errors is left very large in the end.
Risk aversion and intertemporal substitution — more recent estimates
The fact that quite high risk aversion is required to digest the equity premium is robust
in consumption-based model estimation, as the equity premium discussion below makes
27clear. The parameter needed to understand theb e h a v i o ro fas i n g l ea s s e to v e rt i m e ,a n d
in particular to line up variation in expected consumption growth with variation in interest
rates, is less certain. This number, (or more precisely its inverse, how much consumption
growth changes when interest rates go up 1% ) is usually called the intertemporal substitution
elasticity since it captures how much people are willing to defer consumption when presented
with a large return opportunity. While Hansen and Singleton found numbers near one, Hall
(1988) argued the estimate should be closer to zero, i.e. a very high risk aversion coeﬃcient
here as well. Hall emphasizes the diﬃculties of measuring both real interest rates and
especially consumption growth.
A good deal of the more recent macro literature has tended to side with Hall. Campbell
(2003) gives an excellent summary with estimates. Real interest rates have moved quite a
bit, and slowly, over time, especially in the period since the early 1980s when Hansen and
Singleton wrote. Thus, there is a good deal of predictable variation in real interest rates.
After accounting for time aggregation and other problems, consumption growth is only very
poorly predictable. Lining up the small movements in expected consumption growth against
large movements in real interest rates, we see a small intertemporal substitution elasticity, or
a large risk aversion coeﬃcient. At least now both moments consistently demand the same
puzzlingly high number!
4.2 New utility functions
Given problems with the consumption-based model, the most natural place to start is by
questioning the utility function. Functional form is not really an issue, since linearized and
nonlinear models already behave similarly. Diﬀerent arguments of the utility function are a
more likely source of progress. Perhaps the marginal utility of consumption today depends
on variables other than today’s consumption.
To get this eﬀect, the utility function must be non-separable. If a utility function is
separable, u(c,x)=v(c)+w(x), then ∂u(c,x)/∂c = v0(c)a n dx does not matter. This is
the implicit assumption that allowed us to use only nondurable consumption rather than
total consumption in the ﬁrst place. To have marginal utility of consumption depend on
something else, we must have a functional form that does not add up in this way, so that
∂u(c,x)/∂c is a function of x,t o o .
The ﬁrst place to look for nonseparability is across goods. Perhaps the marginal utility of
nondurable consumption is aﬀected by durables, or by leisure. Also, business cycles are much
clearer in durables purchases and employment data, so business-cycle risk in stock returns
may correlate better with these variables than with nondurable and services consumption.
One problem with this generalization is that we don’t have much intuition for which way
the eﬀect should go. If you work harder, does that make a TV more valuable as a break from
all that work, or less valuable since you have less time to enjoy it? Thus, will you believe an
estimate that relies strongly on one or the other eﬀect?
28We can also consider nonseparability over time. This was always clear for durable goods.
If you bought a car last year, it still provides utility today. One way to model this nonsep-






tu(kt); kt+1 =( 1− δ)kt + ct+1.
This expression is equivalent to writing down a utility function in which last year’s purchases













If u(·)i sc o n c a v e ,t h i sf u n c t i o ni sn o n s e parable, so marginal utility at t is aﬀected by con-
sumption (purchases) at t − j. At some horizon, all goods are durable. Yesterday’s pizza
lowers the marginal utility for another pizza today.
Following this line also leads us to thinking about the opposite direction: habits. If good
times lead people to acquire a “taste for the good life,” higher consumption in the past might
raise rather than lower the marginal utility of consumption today. A simple formulation is




















Again, you see how this natural idea leads to a nonseparable utility function in which past
consumption can aﬀect marginal utility today.
Ad i ﬃculty in adding multiple goods is that, if the nonseparability is strong enough to
aﬀect asset prices, it tends to aﬀect other prices as well. People start to care a lot about the
composition of their consumption stream. Therefore, if we hold quantities ﬁxed (as in the
endowment-economy GMM tradition), such models tend to predict lots of relative price and
interest-rate variation; if we hold prices ﬁx e ds u c hm o d e l st e n dt op r e d i c tl o t so fq u a n t i t y
variation, including serial correlation in consumption growth. An investigation with multiple
goods needs to include the ﬁrst order condition for allocation across goods, and this often
causes trouble.
Finally, utility could be nonseparable across states of nature. E p s t e i na n dZ i n( 1 9 9 1 )
pioneered this idea in the asset-pricing literature. The expected utility function adds over






















(I use Hansen, Heaton and Li’s (2005) notation) that among other things abandons separabil-








1−γ is sometimes called a “risk adjustment”
or the “certain equivalent” of future utility. The Epstein-Zin formulation separates the co-
eﬃcient of risk aversion γ from the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ρ.
Equation (13) reduces to power utility for ρ = γ.M o d e l s w i t h n o n - time separable utilities
(habits, durables) also distinguish risk aversion and intertemporal substitution, but not in
such a simple way.




















(The appendix contains a short derivation.) If ρ 6= γ, we see a second term; expected returns
will depend on covariances with changes in the utility index, capturing news about the
investor’s future prospects, as well as on covariances with consumption growth. As we
will see, a large number of modiﬁcations to the standard setup lead to a marginal rate of
substitution that is the old power formula times a multiplicative new piece.
The utility index itself is not directly measurable, so to make this formula operational
we need some procedure for measurement. It turns out that the utility index is proportional
















(This formula is also derived in the appendix.) This eﬀect provides a route to including stock
returns in the asset pricing model alongside consumption growth, which of course can give a
much improved ﬁt. This was the central theoretical and empirical point of Epstein and Zin
(1991). However, this modiﬁcation stands a bit on shaky ground: the substitution only works
for the entire wealth portfolio (claim to future consumption), including nontraded assets
such as real estate and the present value of labor income, not the stock market return alone.
Furthermore, wealth and consumption do not move independently; news about consumption
growth moves the wealth return.
To emphasize the latter point, Restoy and Weil (1988, p. 10) show how to approximate
30the wealth return by a discounted sum of future consumption, leading to a formula valid
near ρ =1 ,
(Et+1 − Et)logmt+1 ≈ (Et+1 − Et)
"







where small letters denote logs of capital letters. Future long-horizon consumption growth
enters the current period marginal rate of substitution. In essence, this formulation tracks
the wealth-portfolio return or utility index term back to its source in future values of con-
sumption. Thus, variables that predict future consumption growth will appear as additional
risk factors even with (perfectly measured) current consumption growth.
4.3 Empirics with new utility functions
Nonseparabilities across goods
Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988) is an early paper that combined nonsepara-
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where l denotes leisure. However, they only test the model on the Treasury bill return,
not the equity premium or certainly not the Fama-French portfolios. They also focus on
parameter estimates and test statistics rather than pricing errors. Clearly, it is still an open
and interesting question whether this extension of the consumption-based model can address
what we now understand are the interesting questions.7
Eichenbaum and Hansen (1990) investigate a similar model with nonseparability between
durables and nondurables. This is harder because one needs also to model the relation
between observed durable purchases and the service ﬂow which enters the utility function.
Also, any model with multiple goods gives rise to an intra temporal ﬁrst order condition,
marginal utility of nondurables / marginal utility of durables = relative price. Eichenbaum
and Hansen solve both problems. However, they again only look at consumption and interest
rates, leaving open how well this model does at explaining our current understanding of
7Lettau (2003) footnote 2 points out that consumption and leisure are negatively correlated (people work
and consume more in expansions). The product c×l and the resulting marginal rate of substitution is then
typically less volatile than with c alone, making the equity premium puzzle worse. However, the greater
correlation of labor with asset returns may still make asset pricing work better, especially if one admits a
large risk aversion coeﬃcient.
31cross-sectional risk premia.
In the consumption-based revival, Yogo (2004) reconsiders nonseparability across goods











He embeds this speciﬁcation in an Epstein-Zin aggregator (13) over time. This framework
allows Yogo to use quite high risk aversion without the implication of wildly varying interest
rates. Following tradition in the Epstein-Zin literature, he uses the market portfolio return
to proxy for the wealth portfolio or utility index which appears in the marginal rate of
substitution.
Estimating the model on the Fama-French 25 size and book/market portfolios, along with
the 3 month T bill rate, and including the intra-temporal ﬁrst order condition for durables
vs. nondurables, he estimates high (γ = 191; 1/γ =0 .005) risk aversion, as is nearly
universal in models that account for the equity premium. He estimates a larger elasticity
of intertemporal substitution σ =0 .024 to explain a low and relatively constant interest
rate, and a modest 0.54 - 0.79 (depending on method) elasticity of substitution between
durables and nondurables. As in the discussion of Piazzesi, Schneider and Tuzel above, the
diﬀerence between this modest elasticity and the much smaller σ and 1/γ means that the
nonseparabilities matter, and durables do aﬀect the marginal utility of consumption.
Yogo linearizes this model giving a discount factor linear in consumption growth, durable
consumption growth, and the market return
mt+1 ≈ a − b1∆ct+1 − b2∆dt+1 − b3rWt+1
This linearized model prices the Fama French 25 portfolios (except the small growth portfolio,
left out of many studies) with a large cross-sectional R2.B y l i n e a r i z i n g , Y o g o i s a b l e t o
display that there is a substantial spread in betas, addressing the concern that a model
prices well by an insigniﬁcant spread in betas and a huge risk premium. Yogo also shows
some evidence that variation in conditional mean returns lines up with varying conditional
covariances on these three factors.
Pakos (2004) also considers durables vs. nondurables, using the nonlinear speciﬁcation,
dealing with the intra-temporal ﬁrst order condition (durable vs. nondurable and their
relative price), and considering the level of the interest rate as well as the equity premium
and the Fama-French 25 portfolios. Pakos needs an extreme unwillingness to substitute
durable for nondurable consumption in order to make quantitatively important diﬀerences
to asset pricing. To keep the durable vs. nondurable ﬁrst order condition happy, given
the downward trend in the ratio of durables to nondurables, he adds an income elasticity
(non-homothetic preferences).
32Habits
Ferson and Constantinides (1991) took the lead in estimating a model with temporal
nonseparabilities. One has to face parameter profusion in such models; they do it by limiting
the nonseparability to one lag, so the utility function is
u(ct − bct−1). (17)
This is one of the ﬁrst papers to include an interesting cross section of assets, including the
market (equity premium) and some size portfolios, along with a modern set of instruments,
including dividend/price ratio and T bill rate, that actually forecast returns. However, much
of the model’s apparently good performance comes down to larger standard errors rather
than smaller pricing errors.
Heaton (1993, 1995) considers the joint eﬀects of time aggregation, habit persistence
and durability on the time series process for consumption and on consumption-based asset
pricing models. The 1993 paper focuses on consumption, showing how the random walk
in consumption that occurs with quadratic utility and constant real rates is replaced by
interesting autocorrelation patterns with time aggregation, habit persistence, and durability.
Heaton (1995) then integrates these ideas into the speciﬁcation of consumption-based asset
pricing models, not an easy task. In particular, Heaton gives us a set of tools with which to
address time-aggregation, and Campbell and Cochrane (2000) argue in a simulation model
that time-aggregation helps a lot to explain consumption-based model failures. Sensibly,
Heaton ﬁnds signs of both durability and habit persistence, with durability dominating at
short horizons (even a Pizza is durable at a one-minute horizon) and habit persistence at
longer horizons. However, he only considers the value-weighted stock market and T-bill rate
as assets.
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) adapt a habit persistence model to generate a number of
asset pricing facts. We replace the utility function u(C)w i t hu(C − X)w h e r eX denotes









Habits move slowly in response to consumption The easiest speciﬁc a t i o nw o u l db ea nA R ( 1 ) ,
Xt = φXt−1 + λCt. (18)
(Small letters denote the logs of large letters throughout this section, ct =l nCt, etc.) This
speciﬁcation means that habit can act as a “trend” line for consumption; as consumption
declines relative to the “trend” in a recession, people will become more risk averse, stock
prices will fall, expected returns will rise, and so on.
The idea is not implausible (well, not to us at least). Anyone who has had a large
p i z z ad i n n e ro rs m o k e dac i g a r e t t ek n o w st h a tw h a ty o uc o n s u m e dy e s t e r d a yc a nh a v ea n
impact on how you feel about more consumption today. Might a similar mechanism apply for
consumption in general and at a longer time horizon? Perhaps we get used to an accustomed
33standard of living, so a fall in consumption hurts after a few years of good times, even though
the same level of consumption might have seemed very pleasant if it arrived after years of
bad times. This thought can at least explain the perception that recessions are awful events,
even though a recession year may be just the second or third best year in human history
rather than the absolute best. Law, custom and social insurance also insure against falls
in consumption as much or more than as low levels of consumption. But it seems more
sensible that habits move slowly in response to consumption experience rather than with
the one-period lag of many speciﬁcations. In addition, slow-moving habits will generate the
slow-moving state variables we seem to see in return forecastability.
We specify a nonlinear version of (18). This nonlinear version allows us to avoid an
Achilles heel of many habit models, huge variation in interest rates. When consumers have
habits, they are anxious in bad times (consumption close to habit) to borrow against com-
ing good times (consumption grows away from habit). This anxiousness results in a high
interest rate, and vice versa in good times. The nonlinear version of (18) allows us to
oﬀset this “intertemporal substitution” eﬀect with a “precautionary savings” eﬀect. In bad
times, consumers are also more risk averse, so rather than borrow to push consumption above
habit today, they save to make more sure that consumption does not fall even more tomor-
row. The nonlinear version of (18) allows us to control these two eﬀects. In Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) we make the interest rate constant. The working paper version (Campbell
and Cochrane 1995) showed how to make interest rates vary with the state and thus create
an interesting term structure model with time-varying risk premia.
This sort of reverse-engineering is important in a wide variety of models. Devices that
increase the volatility of the discount factor or marginal rate of substitution across states of
nature σt(mt+1), to generate a large equity premium, also tend to increase the volatility of
the marginal rate of substitution over time σ(Et(mt+1)), thus generating counterfactually
large interest rate variation. To be empirically plausible, it takes some care to set up a model
so that it has a lot of the former variation with little of the latter.
We examine the model’s behavior by a combination of simulation and simple moment-
matching rather than a full-blown estimation on an interesting cross-section of portfolios,
as do Constantinides (1990), Abel (1990), and Sundaresan’s (1989) habit persistence inves-
tigations. We let aggregate consumption follow a random walk, we calibrate the model to
match sample means including the equity pre m i u m ,a n dw et h e nc o m p a r et h eb e h a v i o ro f
common time-series tests in our artiﬁcial data to their outcome in real data. The model
matches the time-series facts mentioned above quite well. In particular, the dividend/price
ratio forecasts stock returns, and variance decompositions ﬁnd all variation in stock prices
is due to changing expected returns.
In this model, the marginal rate of substitution — growth in the marginal value of wealth
or discount factor — between dates t and t+k depends on change in the ratio of consumption










34where St =( Ct − Xt)/Ct and Xt is habit. As the time period lengthens, the latter eﬀect
becomes more important. The basic question is, “why do people fear stocks so much?” This
model’s answer is not so much that they fear that stocks will decline when consumption is
low in absolute terms (C); the answer is that they fear stocks will decline in future recessions,
times when consumption falls low relative to habits (S).
A large number of models amount to something like Equation (19), in which the discount
factor generalizes the power-utility case by adding another state variable. There is a danger
in such models that they often work well for short run returns, but not in the long run.
The trouble is that S is stationary, while consumption of course is a random walk. Now,
to generate an equity premium or any large Sharpe ratio, we need a large volatility of the
discount factor σ(M), and to generate an equity premium in long-run returns we need the
variance of the discount factor to increase linearly with horizon. If the second term S−γ is
stationary, it may contribute a lot to the volatility of one-period discount factors, but in
the long run we will be right back to the power utility model and all its problems, since the
variance of a stationary variable approaches a limit while the variance of the random walk
consumption component increases without bounds. This turns out not to be a problem for
the Campbell-Cochrane model: while St is stationary, S
−γ
t is not, and its conditional variance
grows without bound. Thus, at any horizon the equity premium is generated by covariance
with S−γ not so much by covariance with consumption growth. This result stems from our
nonlinear habit accumulation process. It may not be there in many superﬁcially attractive
simpliﬁcations or linearizations of the habit model.
Simulation is a prequel to empirical work, not a substitute, so this sort of model needs to
be evaluated in a modern cross-sectional setting, for example in the Fama French 25 size and
book/market portfolios. Surprisingly, no one has tried this (including Campbell and myself).
The closest eﬀort is Chen and Ludvigson (2004). They evaluate a related habit model using
the Fama-French 25 size and book/market portfolios. They use a “nonparametric” (really,
highly parametric) three-lag version of the MA habit speciﬁcation (17) rather than the slow-
moving counterpart (18). Comparing models based on Hansen-Jagannathan (1997) distance,
which is a sum of squared pricing errors weighted by the inverse of the second-moment matrix
of returns, they ﬁnd the resulting consumption-based model performs quite well, even better
than the Fama-French three-factor model. Within this structure, they ﬁnd the “internal
habit” version of the model performs better than the “external habit” version in which
each person’s habit is set by the consumption of his neighbors. (I add the qualiﬁer “within
this structure” because in other structures internal and external habits are observationally
indistinguishable.) The “internal habit” speciﬁcation may be able to exploit the correlation
of returns with subsequent consumption growth, which is also the key to Parker and Julliard
(2005), discussed below.
Wachter (2004) extends the habit model to think seriously about the term structure of
interest rates, in particular adding a second shock and making a quantitative comparison to
the empirical ﬁndings of the term structure literature such as Fama and Bliss’ (1987) ﬁnding
that forward-spot spreads forecast excess bond returns.
Verdelhan (2004) extends the habit model to foreign exchange premia. Here the puzzle
35is that high foreign interest rates relative to domestic interest rates signal to higher returns
in foreign bonds, even after including currency risk. His explanation is straightforward. The
ﬁrst part of the puzzle is, why should (say) the Euro/dollar exchange rate covary with US
consumption growth, generating a risk premium? His answer is to point out that in complete
markets the exchange rate is simply determined by the ratio of foreign to domestic marginal
utility growth, so the correlation pops out naturally. The second part of the puzzle is,
why should this risk premium vary over time? In the habit model, recessions, times when
consumption is close to habit, are times of low interest rates, and also times of high risk
premium (people are more risk averse when consumption is near habit.) Voil´ a, the interest
rate spread forecasts a time-varying exchange rate risk premium. More generally, these
papers pave the way to go beyond equity, value, size and momentum premiums to start
thinking about bond risk premia and foreign exchange risk premia.
Related models
The essence of these models really does not hinge on habits per se, as a large number
of microeconomic mechanisms can give rise to a discount factor of the form (19), where
C is aggregate consumption and S is a slow moving business cycle related state variable.
Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996), discussed below, generate a discount factor of the form
(19), in a model with power utility but idiosyncratic shocks. The “S” component is generated
by the cross-sectional variance of the idiosyncratic shocks.
In Piazzesi, Schneider and Tuzel (2004), the share of housing consumption in total con-
sumption plays the role of habits. They specify that utility is nonseparable between non-
housing consumption and consumption of housing services; you need a roof to enjoy the new












Here, α is the expenditure share of non-housing services, which varies slowly over the business
cycle just like S in (19). Housing services are part of the usual nondurable and services
aggregate of course; the paper essentially questions the accuracy of price indices used to
aggregate housing services into overall services.
Does more housing raise or lower the marginal utility of other consumption, and do we
trust this eﬀect? Piazzesi, Schneider and Tuzel calibrate the elasticity of substitution ε from
the behavior of the share and relative prices, exploiting the static ﬁrst order condition. If
ε = 1, the share of housing is the same for all prices. They ﬁnd that ε =1 .27: When
housing prices rise, the quantity falls enough that the share of housing expenditure actually
falls slightly. This does not seem like an extreme value. As (20) shows though, whether the
housing share enters positively or negatively in marginal utility depends on the substitutabil-
ity of consumption over time and states, σ as well as the substitutability of housing for other
consumption ε. Like others, they calibrate to a relatively large risk premium, hence small
σ. This calibration means that the housing share enters negatively in the marginal rate of
substitution; a lower housing share makes you “hungrier” for other consumption.
36Most of Piazzesi, Schneider and Tuzel’s empirical work also consists of a simulation model.
They use an i.i.d. consumption growth process, and they ﬁt an AR(1) to the housing share.
They then simulate artiﬁcial data on the stock price as a levered claim to consumption.
The model works very much like the Campbell-Cochrane model. Expected returns are high,
matching the equity premium, because investors are afraid that stocks will fall when the
housing share α is low in recessions. (They also document the correlation between α and
stock returns in real data). Interest rates are low, both from a precautionary savings eﬀect
due to the volatility of α and due to the mean α growth. Interest rates vary over time,
since α moves slowly over time and there are periods of predictable α growth. Variation
in the conditional moments of α generates a time varying risk premium. Thus, the model
generates returns predictable from price-dividend ratios and from housing share ratio. They
verify the latter prediction, adding to the list of macro variables that forecast returns. (See
Table 4 and Table 5). Finally, the model generates slow-moving, variation in price-dividend
ratios and stock return volatility, all coming from risk premia rather than dividend growth.
However, the second term is stationary in their model, so it is likely that this model does
not produce a long-run equity premium.
Lustig and Van Niewerburgh (2004a, 2004b) explore a similar model. Here, variations
in housing collateral play the role of the “habit.” Consumer-investor (-homeowners) whose
housing collateral declines become eﬀectively more risk averse. Lustig and Van Niewerburgh
show that variations in housing collateral predict stock returns in the data, as the surplus
consumption ratio predicts stock returns in the Cambpell-Cochrane model. They also show
that a conditional consumption CAPM using housing collateral as a conditioning variable
explains the value-size cross sectional eﬀects, as implied by their model, in the same manner
as with the Lettau-Ludvigson (2001a,b) cay state variable.
Raj Chetty and Adam Szeidl (2004) show how consumption commitments mimic habits.
If in good times you buy a house, it is diﬃcult to unwind that decision in bad times. Non-
housing consumption must therefore decline disproportionately. Chetty and Szeidl show that
this mechanism mimics habits in aggregate consumption. They also show that people who
have recently moved for exogenous reasons hold a smaller proportion of stocks, acting in
more risk-averse manner.
Long horizons
Nobody expects the consumption-based model (and data) to work at arbitrarily high
frequencies. We do not calibrate purchasing an extra cup of coﬀee against the last hour’s
stock returns. Even if consumers act “perfectly” (i.e. ignoring all transaction, information,
etc. costs), high-frequency data are unreliable. If ∆ct and rt are perfectly correlated but
independent over time, a one period timing error, in which you mistakenly line up ∆ct−1
with rt will show no correlation at all. The methods for collecting quantity data are just
not attuned to getting high-frequency timing just right, and the fact that returns are much
better correlated with macro variables one or two quarters later than they are with contem-
poraneous macro variables is suggestive. The data deﬁnitions break down at high frequency
too. Clothing is “nondurable.”
37In sum, at some high frequency, we expect consumption and return data to be de-linked.
Conversely, at some low enough frequency, we know consumption and stock market values
must move one for one; both must eventually track the overall level of the economy and
the consumption/wealth ratio will neither grow without bound nor decline to zero. Thus,
some form of the consumption model may well hold at a long-enough horizon. Following
this intuition, a number of authors have found germs of truth in long-run relations between
consumption and returns.
Daniel and Marshall (1997) showed that consumption growth and aggregate returns be-
come more correlated at longer frequencies. They don’t do a formal estimation, but they
do conclude that the equity premium is less of a puzzle at longer frequencies. Brainard,
Nelson, and Shapiro (1991) show that the consumption CAPM performance gets better in
some dimensions at longer horizons. However, these greater correlations do not mean the
model is a total success, as other moments still do not line up. For example, Cochrane and
Hansen (1992) ﬁnd that long-horizon consumption performs worse in Hansen-Jagannathan
bounds. There are fewer consumption declines in long-horizon data, and the observation
that (Ct+k/Ct)
−γ can enter a Hansen-Jagannathan bound at high risk aversion depends on
consumption declines raised to a large power to bring up the mean discount factor and solve
t h er i s kf r e er a t ep u z z l e .
Most recently and most spectacularly, Jagannathan and Wang (2005) ﬁnd that by using
fourth quarter to fourth quarter nondurable and services consumption, the simple consump-
tion based model can account for the Fama-French 25 size and book/market portfolios. The
ﬁgure below captures this result dramatically. On reﬂection, this is a natural result. A lot
of purchases happen at Christmas, and with an annual planning horizon. Time aggregation
and seasonal adjustment alone would make it unlikely that monthly average consumption
would line up with end of month returns. And it is a stunning result: the simple power
utility consumption based model does work quite well after all, at least for one horizon (an-
nual). Of course, not everything works. The model is linearized (Jagannathan and Wang
examine average returns vs. betas on consumption growth), the slope coeﬃcient of average
returns on betas does imply an admittedly rather high risk aversion coeﬃcient, and there
are still many moments for which the model does not work. But it is a delightful sign that
at least one sensible moment does work, and delightful to see an economic connection to the
puzzling value premium.
38Top panel: Average returns of Fama-French 25 portfolios vs. predictions of
the linearized consumption-based model (essentially, consumption betas) and vs.
predictions of the Fama-French 3 factor model. Fourth-quarter to fourth-quarter
data, 1954-2003. Source: Jagannathan and Wang (2005) Figure 2.
Parker and Julliard (2005) similarly examine whether size and book to market portfolios
can be priced by their exposure to “long-run” consumption risk. Speciﬁcally, they examine
whether a multiperiod return formed by investing in stocks for one period and then trans-



















39They argue that this moment condition is robust to measurement errors in consumption and
simple “errors” by consumers. For example, they argue that if consumers adjust consump-
tion slowly to news, this moment will work while the standard one will not. Parker and
Julliard ﬁnd that this model accounts for the value premium. Returns at date t +1f o r e -
cast subsequent consumption growth very slightly, and this forecastability accounts for the
results. In addition to selecting one of many possible long run moment conditions, Parker
and Julliard leave the moment condition for the level of the interest rate out, thus avoiding
equity premium puzzles.
Lustig and Verdelhan (2004) do a standard consumption-beta test on foreign exchange
returns at an annual horizon, and ﬁnd, surprisingly, that the standard consumption based
model works quite well. One of their clever innovations is to use portfolios, formed by going
in to high interest rate countries and out of low interest rate countries. As in the rest of
asset pricing, portfolios can isolate the eﬀect one is after and can oﬀer a stable set of returns.
E p s t e i na n dZ i na n dt h el o n gr u n
Epstein and Zin (1991) is the classic empirical investigation of preferences that are non-
separable across states. Ambitiously, for the time, they have some cross section of returns,
ﬁve industry portfolios. The instruments are lags of consumption and market returns. But
industry portfolios don’t show much variation in expected returns to begin with, and we
now know that variables such as D/P and consumption/wealth have much more power to















amounted to showing that by using the stock market portfolio as a proxy for the utility index
the consumption-based model could perform as well as the CAPM,
mt+1 = a − bR
W
t+1.
Alas, now we know the CAPM doesn’t perform that well on a more modern set of portfolios
and instruments. How these preferences work in a consumption-based estimation with a
more modern setup has yet to be investigated.
The Epstein-Zin framework has made a dramatic comeback along with the renewed in-
terest in long-run phenomena. As discussed above, the Restoy and Weil (1998) expression
of the discount factor ties the discount factor to news about future consumption as well as
to current consumption.
(Et+1 − Et)logmt+1 ≈ (Et+1 − Et)
"







Hansen, Heaton and Li (2005) point out that this expression gives another interpretation to
Parker and Julliard (2005). The resulting moment condition is almost exactly the same as
40that in (21); the only diﬀerence is the string of R
f
t+j in (21) and they are typically small and
relatively constant. If the return at t + 1 predicts a string of small changes in consumption
growth ∆ct+j,t h eﬁnding underlying Parker and Julliard’s result, then the second term in
this expression of the Epstein-Zin discount factor will pick it up.
Bansal and Yaron (2004) exploit (23) in a simulation economy context. Concentrate on
the behavior of the market return, they hypothesize that consumption, rather than being a
random walk, continues to grow after a shock. Together with an assumption of conditional
heteroskedasticity, the second term in (23) can then act as an “extra factor” to generate a
high equity premium, return volatility and the fact that returns are forecastable over time.
Bansal, Dittmar and Lundblad (2005) also argue that average returns of value vs. growth
stocks can be understood by diﬀerent covariances with long-run consumption growth in this
framework. They examine long-run covariances of earnings with consumption, rather than
those of returns. This is an interesting innovation; eventually ﬁnance must relate asset
prices to the properties of cashﬂows rather than “explain” today’s price by the covariance
of tomorrow’s price with a factor (β). Also, long-run returns must eventually converge to
long-run dividend and earnings growth, since valuation ratios are stationary.
However, Hansen, Heaton and Li (2004b) show that Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad’s
evidence that value stocks have much diﬀerent long-run-consumption-betas than do growth
stocks depends crucially on the inclusion of a time trend in the regression of earnings on
consumption. In the data, earnings and consumption move about one for one, as one might
expect. With a time trend, a strong time trend and a strong opposing regression coeﬃcient
oﬀset each other, leading to Bansal Dittmar and Lundblad’s ﬁnding of a strong beta to
explain value premia. Without the time trend, all the betas are about one.
Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) have started to apply the framework to bonds. They
generate risk premia in the term structure by the ability of state variables to forecast future
consumption growth.
Questions
The central questions for the empirical importance of the Epstein-Zin framework are 1)
Is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution really that diﬀerent from the coeﬃcient of risk
aversion? and 2) Are there really important dynamics in consumption growth?
As discussed above, the evidence on the intertemporal substitution elasticity is not yet
decisive, since there just isn’t that much time variation in real interest rates and expected
consumption growth to correlate. On intuitive grounds, it’s not obvious why people would
strongly resist substitution of consumption across states of nature, but happily accept sub-
stitution of consumption over time. Why would you willingly put oﬀ going out to dinner for
a year in exchange for a free drink (high intertemporal elasticity), but refuse a bet of that
dinner for one at the fanciest restaurant in town (high risk aversion)?
Dynamics are vital. If consumption growth is unpredictable, then Epstein-Zin utility is
observationally equivalent to power utility, a point made by Kocherlakota (1990). This is
41clear in (23) but it is true more generally. If there is no information about future consumption
growth at t +1t h e nUt+1 depends only on ct+1; there are no other state variables. Now,
consumption growth is the least forecastable of all macroeconomic time series, for good
reasons that go back to Hall’s (1978) random walk ﬁnding, especially if one takes out the
eﬀects of time aggregation, slightly durable goods, seasonal adjustment, and measurement
error.
Parker and Julliard (2005) provide evidence on the central question: how much do cur-
rent returns Rt+1 forecast long-horizon future consumption growth
Pk
j=1 ∆ct+j?A l a s , t h e y
include ∆ct+1, so we do not know from the table how important is the Epstein-Zin innova-
tion, forecasts of
Pk
j=2 ∆ct+k, and they give unweighted truncated forecasts rather than an
estimate of the weighted inﬁnite horizon forecast
P∞
j=2 βj∆ct+j. Still, one can infer from
their table the general result: the forecastability of future consumption growth by current
returns is economically tiny, statistically questionable and certainly poorly measured. The
returns hmlt+1 and smbt+1 together generate a maximum forecast R2 of 3.39% at a one year
horizon. That R2 is a good deal lower at longer horizons we are interested in, 1.23% at 3
years and 0.15% at nearly 4 years, and some of that predictability comes from the 1.78% R2
from explaining ∆ct+1 from returns at time t +1 .
Long-run properties of anything are hard to measure, as made clear in this context by
the Hansen Heaton and Li (2004b) sensitivity analysis. Now, one may imagine interesting
long run properties of consumption growth, and one may ﬁnd that speciﬁcations within one
standard error of the very boring point estimates have important asset pricing eﬀects, which
is essentially what Bansal and Yaron (2004) do. But without strong direct evidence for the
required long run properties of consumption growth, the conclusions will always be a bit
shaky. Without independent measurements, movements in long-run consumption growth
forecasts (the second term in (23)) act like unobservable shifts in marginal utility, or shifts
in “sentiment,” which are always suspicious explanations for anything. At a minimum, an
explanation based diﬃcult-to-observe shifts in long-run consumption growth should parsi-
moniously tie together many asset pricing phenomena.
A ﬁnal doubt
An alternative strand of thought says we don’t need new utility functions at all in order to
match the aggregate facts. If the conditional moments of consumption growth vary enough
over time, then we can match the aggregate facts with a power utility model. Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) starts with the premise that aggregate consumption is a pure random walk,
so any dynamics must come from preferences. Kandel and Stambaugh (1990, 1991) construct
models in which time-varying consumption moments do all the work. For example, from
Et(Re
t+1)/σt(Re
t+1) ≈ γσt (∆ct+1), conditional heteroskedasticity in consumption growth can
generate a time-varying Sharpe ratio. The empirical question is again whether consumption
growth really is far enough from i.i.d. to generate the large variations in expected returns
that we see. There isn’t much evidence for conditional heteroskedasticity in consumption
growth, but with high risk aversion you might not need a lot, so one might be able to assume
a consumption process less than one standard error from point estimates that generates all
sorts of interesting asset pricing behavior.
42The Epstien-Zin literature is to some extent going back to this framework. Bansal and
Yaron (2004) for example, add conditional heteroskedasiticty in consumption growth to
generate time-varying risk premiums just as Kandel and Stambaugh do. The Epstein-Zin
framework gives another tool — properties of long run consumption Et
P
βj∆ct+j to work
with, but the philosophy is in many respects the same.
4.4 Consumption and factor models
A second tradition also has reemerged with some empirical success. Breeden, Gibbons and
Litzenberger (1989), examine a linearized version of the consumption-based model, a form
more familiar to ﬁnancial economists. Breeden, Gibbons and Litzenberger just ask whether
average returns line up with betas computed relative to consumption growth, they correct
for a number of problems with consumption data, and they use a set of industry portfo-
lios. They ﬁnd the consumption-based model does about as well as the CAPM. This work,
along with Breeden (1979) and other theoretical presentations, was important in bringing the
consumption-based model to the ﬁnance community. Breeden emphasized that consumption
should stand in for all of the other factors including wealth, state variables for investment
opportunities, non-traded income, and so forth that pervade ﬁnance models. More recent
empirical research has raised the bar somewhat: industry portfolios show much less varia-
tion in mean returns than size and book-to-market portfolios that dominate cross-sectional
empirical work. In addition, we typically use as instruments variables such as the dividend
price ratio that forecast returns much better than lagged returns.
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b) is the ﬁrst modern reexamination of a consumption-based
factor model, the ﬁrst recent paper that ﬁnds some success in pricing the value premium
from a macro-based model, and nicely illustrates current trends in how we evaluate models.
Lettau and Ludvigson examine a conditional version of the linearized consumption-based
model in this modern testing ground. In our notation, they specify that the stochastic
discount factor or growth in marginal utility of wealth is
mt+1 = a +( b0 + b1zt) × ∆ct+1
They also examine a conditional CAPM,
mt+1 = a +( b0 + b1zt) × R
w
t+1
The innovation is to allow the slope coeﬃcient b, which acts as the risk-aversion coeﬃcient
in the model, to vary over time. They use the consumption-wealth ratio to measure zt.
In traditional ﬁnance language, this speciﬁcation is equivalent to a factor model in which




Though consumption is the only factor, the unconditional mean returns from such a model
43can be related to an unconditional multiple-factor model, in which the most important
additional factor is the product of consumption growth and the forecasting variable,
E(R
ei
t+1)=βi,ztλ1 + βi,∆ct+1λ2 + βi,(zt×∆ct+1)λ3.
(See Cochrane 2004 for a derivation.) Thus, a conditional one-factor model may be behind
empirical ﬁndings for an unconditional multi-factor model.
Lettau and Ludvigson’s Figure 1, reproduced below, makes a strong case for the perfor-
mance of the model. Including the scaled consumption factor, they are able to explain the
cross-section of 25 size and book to market portfolios about as well as does the Fama-French
three-factor model. A model that uses labor income rather than consumption as a factor
does almost as well.
This is a tremendous success. This was the ﬁrst paper to even try to price the value eﬀect
with macroeconomic factors. This paper also set a style for many that followed: evaluate a
macro-model by pricing the Fama-French 25 size and book to market portfolios, and present
the results in graphical form of actual mean returns vs. model predictions. We now are
focusing on the pricing errors themselves, and less on whether a test statistic formed by
a quadratic form of pricing errors is large or small by statistical standards. A “rejected”
model with 0.1% pricing errors is a lot more interesting than a “non-rejected” model with
10% pricing errors, and the pattern of pricing erro r sa c r o s sp o r t f o l i o si sr e v e a l i n g .( C o c h r a n e
(1996) also has graphs, but only uses size portfolios. Fama and French (1996) also encouraged
this shift in attention by presenting average returns and pricing errors across portfolios, but
in tabular rather than graphical format.)
Following Lettau and Ludvigson, so many papers have found high cross-sectional R2 in
the Fama-French 25 portfolios using ad-hoc macro models (m = linear functions of macro
variables with free coeﬃcients), that it is worth remembering the limitations of the technique.
Cross-sectional R2 (average returns on predicted average returns) can be a dangerous
statistic. First, the cross-sectional R2 rises automatically as we add factors. With (say) 10
factors in 25 portfolios, a high sample R2 is not that surprising. In addition, to the extent
that the Fama-French three-factor model works, the information in the 25 portfolios is really
all contained in the three factor portfolios, so there are really that much fewer degrees
of freedom. Second, the cross-sectional R2 and the corresponding visual look of plots like
Lettau and Ludvigson’s Figure 1 are not invariant to portfolio formation (Roll and Ross 1994,
Kandel and Stambaugh 1995). We can take linear combinations of the original portfolios to
make the plots look as good or as bad as we want. Third, cross-sectional R2 depends a lot
on the estimation method. R2 is only well-deﬁned for an OLS cross-sectional regression of
average returns on betas with a free intercept. For any other estimation technique, and in
particular for the popular time-series regression as used by Fama and French, various ways
44Figure 3: Lettau and Ludvigson Figure 1
of computing R2 can give wildly diﬀerent results.8
These criticisms are of course solved by statistical measures; test statistics based on
α0cov(α,α0)−1α where α is a vector of pricing errors are invariant to portfolio formation and
take account of degrees of freedom. However, one can respond that the original portfolios are










only hold when b is the OLS estimate. Some of these calculations can give R2 greater than one or less than
zero when applied to other estimation techniques.
45the interesting ones; the portfolios that modify R2 a lot have unnatural and large long-short
positions, and we certainly don’t want to go back to the old days of simply displaying p
values and ignoring these much more revealing measures of model ﬁt. Surely the answer is
to present both formal test statistics and carefully chosen diagnostics such as the R2.
O n c et h eg a m eg o e sp a s t“ d oa sw e l la st h eF a m a - F r e n c ht h r e ef a c t o rm o d e li nt h e
Fama-French 25 portfolios” and moves on to “do better than Fama-French in pricing these
portfolios,” that means pricing Fama and French’s failures. The Fama French model does not
do well on small growth and large value stocks. Any model that improves on the Fama-French
cross-sectional R2 does so by better pricing the small growth/large value stocks. But is this
phenomenon real? Is it interesting? As above, I think it would be better for macro models
to focus on pricing the three Fama-French factors rather than the highly cross-correlated 25
portfolios, which really add no more credible information.
M a c r om o d e l sa l s os u ﬀer from the fact that real factors are much less correlated with asset
returns than are portfolio-based factors. The time-series R2 are necessarily lower, so test
results can depend on a few data points (Menzly 2001). This isn’t a defect; it’s exactly what
we should expect from a macro model. But it does make inference less reliable. Lewellen
and Nagel (2004) have also criticized macro models for having too small a spread in betas;
this means that the factor risk premia are unreliably large and the spread in betas may be
spurious. Presumably, correctly-done standard errors should reveal this problem.
Finally, these linearized macro models almost always leave as free parameters the betas,
factor risk premia and (equivalently) the coeﬃcients linking the discount factor to data,
hiding the economic interpretation of these parameters. This observation also applies to
current models on the investment side such as Cochrane (1996) and Li, Vassalou and Ying
(2003) and to most ICAPM style work such as Vassalou (2003), who shows that variables
which forecast GDP growth can price the Fama-French 25 portfolios. Let’s not repeat
the mistake of the CAPM that hid the implied 16% volatility of consumption growth or
extroardinary risk aversion for so many years.
What next, then?
Many people have the impression that consumption-based models were tried and failed.
I hope this review leaves exactly the opposite impression. Despite 20 years of eﬀort, the
consumption-based model and its variants has barely been tried.
The playing ﬁeld for empirical work has changed since the classic investigations of the
consumption-based model and its extension to non-separable utility functions. We now
r o u t i n e l yc h e c ka n ym o d e li nt h es i z ea n db o o k - m arket (and, increasingly, momentum) cross
section rather than industry or beta portfolios, since the former show much more variation in
average returns. When we use instruments, we use a few lags of powerful instruments known
to forecast returns rather than many lags of returns or consumption growth, which are very
weak instruments. We worry about time aggregation (or at least we should!) Above all,
we focus on pricing errors rather than p values, as exempliﬁed by Fama-French style tables
of mean returns, betas, and alphas across portfolios, or by equivalent plots of actual mean
46returns vs. predicted mean returns. We are interested when models capture some moments
quite well, even admitting that they fail on others. We recognize that simulation models, in
which artiﬁcial data display many patterns of real data are interesting, even though those
models may miss other patterns in the data (such as predicting perfect correlations) that
they are easily rejected by formal statistical tests.
This change is part of a larger, dramatic, and unheralded change in the style of empirical
work in ﬁnance. The contrast between, say, Hansen and Singleton (1983) and Fama and
French (1996), each possibly the most important asset pricing paper of its decade, could not
be starker. Both models are formally rejected. But the Fama and French paper persuasively
shows the dimensions in which the model does work; it shows there is a substantial and
credible spread in average returns to start with (not clear in many asset pricing papers), it
shows how betas line up with average returns, and how the betas make the pricing errors
an order of magnitude smaller than the average return spread. In the broader scheme
of things, much of macroeconomics has gone from “testing” to “calibration” in which we
examine economically interesting predictions of models that are easily statistically rejected
(though the “calibration” literature’s resistance to so much as displaying a standard error is
a bit puzzling.)
Of course, we cannot expect authors of 20 years ago to do things as we would today. But
it remains true that we are only beginning to know how the standard consumption-based
model and its extensions to simple nonseparability across time, goods, and states behaves
in this modern testing ground. There is still very much to do to understand where the
consumption-based model works, where it doesn’t work, and how it might be improved.
In all these cases, I have pointed out the limitations, including specializations and lin-
earizations of the models, and selection of which moments to look at and which to ignore.
This is progress, not criticism. We’ve already rejected the model taken literally, i.e. using
arbitrary assets, instruments, and monthly data; there is no need to do that again. But
we learn something quite valuable from knowing which assets, horizons, speciﬁcations, and
instruments do work, and it is gratifying to know that there are some.
5 Production, Investment and General Equilibrium
If we want to link asset prices to macroeconomics, consumption seems like a weak link.
Aggregate nondurable and services consumption is about the smoothest and least cyclical of
all economic time series. Macroeconomic shocks are seen in output, investment, employment
and unemployment, and so forth. Consumers themselves are a weak link; we have to think
about which predictions of the model are robust to small costs of information, transaction
or attention. For example, a one-month delay in adjusting consumption would destroy a
test in monthly data, yet it would have trivial utility costs, or equivalently it could result
from perfect optimization with trivially small transaction and information costs (Cochrane
1989).
475.1 “Production-based asset pricing”
These thoughts led me to want to link asset prices to production through ﬁrm ﬁrst-order
conditions in Cochrane (1991b). This approach should allow us to link stock returns to
genuine business cycle variables, and ﬁrms may do a better job of optimization, i.e., small
information and transactions cost frictions from which our models abstract may be less
important for ﬁrms.
Time series tests
A production technology deﬁnes an “investment return,” the (stochastic) rate of return
that results from investing a little more today and then investing a little less tomorrow.
With a constant returns to scale production function, the investment return should equal
the stock return, data point for data point. The major result is that investment returns —
functions only of investment data — are highly correlated with stock returns.
The prediction is essentially a ﬁrst-diﬀerenced version of the Q theory of investment.
The stock return is pretty much the change in stock price or Q, and the investment return
is pretty much the change in investment/capital ratio. Thus, the ﬁnding is essentially a
ﬁrst-diﬀerenced version of the Q theory prediction that investment should be high when
stock prices are high. This view bore up well even through the gyrations of the late 1990s.
When internet stock prices were high, investment in internet technology boomed. Pastor
and Veronesi (2004) show how the same sort of idea can account for the boom in internet
IPOs as internet stock prices rose. The formation of new ﬁr m sr e s p o n d st om a r k e tp r i c e s
much as does investment by old ﬁrms.
The Q theory also says that investment should be high when expected returns (the cost
of capital) are low, because stock prices are high in such times. Cochrane (1991b) conﬁrms
this prediction: investment to capital ratios predict stock returns.
There has been a good deal of additional work on the relation between investment and
stock returns. Lamont (2000) cleverly uses a survey data set on investment plans.I n v e s t -
ment plans data are great forecasters of actual investment. Investment plans also can avoid
some of the timing issues that make investment expenditures data hard to use. If the stock
price goes up today, it takes time to plan a new factory, draw the plans, design the machin-
ery, issue stock, etc., so investment expenditures can only react with a lag. Investment plans
can react almost instantly. Lamont ﬁnds that investment plans also forecast stock returns,
even better than the investment/capital ratios in Cochrane (1991). Kogan (2004), inspired
by a model with irreversible investment (an asymmetric adjustment cost, really) ﬁnds that
investment forecasts the variance of stock returns as well.
Zhang (2004) uses the Q theory to “explain” many cross-sectional asset pricing anomalies.
Firms with high prices (low expected returns or cost of capital) will invest more, issue more
stock, and go public; ﬁrms with low prices (high expected returns) will repurchase stock.
We see the events, followed by low or high returns, which constitutes the “anomaly.”
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well as to capital. Hiring lots of employees takes time and eﬀo r t ,a n dg e t si nt h ew a yo f
production and investment. This fact means that gross labor ﬂows and their interaction with
investment should also enter into the Q-theory prediction for stock prices and stock returns.
Mertz and Yashiv ﬁnd that the extended model substantially improves the ﬁt; the labor ﬂow
and in particular the interaction of labor and investment correlate well with aggregate stock
market variations. The model matches slow movements in the level of stock prices, such as
the events of the late 1990s, not just the returns or ﬁrst diﬀerences on which my 1991 paper
focused (precisely because it could not match the slow movements of the level). Merz and
Yashiv’s Figure 2 summarizes this central ﬁnding well.
Cross-sectional tests
Cochrane (1996) is an attempt to extend the “production-based” ideas to describe a
cross-section of returns rather than a single (market) return. I use multiple production
technologies, and I investigate the question whether the investment returns from these tech-
nologies span stock returns, i.e. whether a discount factor of the form







for a cross-section of asset returns Rt+1.H e r eR
(i)
t+1 denote the investment returns, functions






t). The paper also explores
scaled factors and returns to incorporate conditioning information, (though Cochrane 2004
does a better job of summarizing this technique) and plots predicted vs. actual mean returns
to evaluate the model.
I only considered size portfolios, not the now-standard size and book-to-market or other
portfolio sorts. Li, Vassalou, and Xing (2003) ﬁnd that an extended version of the model
with four technological factors does account for the Fama-French 25 size and book/market
portfolios, extending the list of macro models that can account for the value eﬀect.
Really “production-based” asset pricing
These papers do not achieve the goal of a “production-based asset pricing model,” which
links macro variables to asset returns independently of preferences. The trouble is that the
technologies we are used to writing down allow ﬁrms to transform goods across time,b u t
not across states of nature. We write functions like yt+1(s)=θt+1(s)f(kt)w h e r es indexes
states at time t+1. Morekt results in more yt+1 in all states, but there is no action the ﬁrm
c a nt a k et oi n c r e a s eo u t p u tyt+1 in one state and reduce it in another state. By contrast, the
usual utility function E [u(c)] =
P
s π(s)u[c(s)] deﬁnes marginal rates of substitution across
all dates and states; mrss1,s2 = {π(s1)u0 [c(s1)]}/{π(s2)u0 [c(s2)]}. Production functions
are kinked (Leontief) across states of nature, so we cannot read contingent claim prices from
outputs as we can read contingent claim prices from state-contingent consumption.
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transformation into economic models. The dynamic spanning literature in asset pricing
naturally suggests the ﬁrst two approaches: allow continuous trading or a large number of
underlying technologies. For example, with one ﬁeld that does well in rainy weather and one
that does well in sunshine, a farmer can span all [rain, shine] contingent claims. Jermann
(2005) pursues the idea of spanning across two states of nature with two technologies, and
constructs a simulation model that reproduces the equity premium based on output data.
Third, we can directly write technologies that allow marginal rates of transformation
across states. Equivalently, we can allow the ﬁrm to choose the distribution of its technology
shock process as it chooses capital and labor. If the ﬁrm’s objective is
max
{kt,εt+1∈Θ}




where m denotes contingent claim prices, then the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to εs
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where θt+1 is an exogenously given shock. As an interpretation, nature hands the ﬁrm a
production shock θt+1,b u tt h eﬁrm can take actions to increase production in one state














Naturally, the ﬁrst order conditions say that the ﬁrm should arrange its technology shocks
to produce more in high-contingent-claim-price states of nature, and produce less in states
of nature for which its output is less valuable.
This extension of standard theory is not that strange. The technologies we write down,
of the form yt+1(s)=ε(s)f(kt) are a historical accident. We started writing technologies for
nonstochastic models and then tacked on shocks. They did not come from a detailed microe-
conomic investigation which persuasively argued that ﬁrms in fact have absolutely no way
to transform output across states of nature, or no choice at all about the distribution of the
shocks they face. Putting the choice of the shock distribution back into production theory,
restoring its symmetry with utility theory, will give us marginal rates of transformation that
we can compare to asset prices.
Belo (2005) takes a crucial step to making this approach work, by proposing a solution to
50the problem of identifying θt+1 in (25). He imposes a restriction that the sets Θ from which
ﬁrms can choose their technology shocks are related. Belo shows that the resulting form






where y denotes output. The derivation produces the typical result in the data that the
bi have large magnitudes and opposing sign. Thus, the standard relative success of macro-
factor models in explaining the Fama-French 25 can be claimed as a success for a truly
“production-based” model as well.
5.2 General Equilibrium
Most eﬀorts to connect stock returns to a fuller range of macroeconomic phenomena instead
construct general equilibrium models. These models include the consumption-based ﬁrst
order condition but also include a full production side. In a general equilibrium model, we
can go through consumers and connect returns to the determinants of consumption, basically
substituting decision rules c(I,Y,..)i n mt+1 = βu0(ct+1)/u0(ct)t ol i n km to I,Y, etc. The
consumption model predictions are still there, but if we throw them out, perhaps citing
measurement issues, we are left with interesting links between asset returns and business
cycle variables.
While vast numbers of general equilibrium asset pricing models have been written down,
I focus here on a few models that make quantitative connections between asset pricing
phenomena and macroeconomics.
Market returns and macroeconomics
Urban Jermann’s (1998) “Asset Pricing in Production Economies” really got this liter-
ature going. This paper starts with a standard real business cycle (one sector stochastic
growth) model and veriﬁes that its asset-pricing implications are a disaster. Capital can
be instantaneously transferred to and from consumption — the technology is of the form
yt = θtf(kt); kt+1 =( 1−δ)kt+(yt−ct). This feature means that the relative price of stocks
— Q, or the market to book ratio — is always exactly one. Stock returns still vary a bit, since
productivity θt is random giving random dividends, but all the stock price ﬂuctuation that
drives the vast majority of real-world return variation is absent.
Jermann therefore adds adjustment costs, as in the Q theory. Now there is a wedge
between the price of “installed” (stock market) capital and “uninstalled” (consumption)
capital. That wedge is larger when investment in larger. This speciﬁcation leads to a good
deal of equilibrium price variation.
Jermann also includes habit persistence in preferences. He ﬁnds that both ingredients
are necessary to give any sort of match to the data. Without habit persistence, marginal
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returns do not vary over time. Without adjustment costs, the habit-persistence consumers
can use the production technology to provide themselves very smooth consumption paths.
In Jermann’s words, “they [consumers] have to care, and they have to be prevented from
doing anything [much] about it.”
The challenge is to see if this kind of model can match asset pricing facts, while at the
same time maintaining if not improving on the real business cycle model’s ability to match
quantity ﬂuctuations. This is not a small challenge: given a production technology, consumers
will try to smooth out large ﬂuctuations in consumption used by endowment economies to
generate stock price ﬂuctuation, and the impediments to transformation across states or time
necessary to give adequate stock price variation could well destroy those mechanisms’ ability
to generate business cycle facts such as the relative smoothness of consumption relative to
investment and output.
Jermann’s model makes progress on both tasks, but leaves much for the rest of us to
do. He matches the equity premium and relative volatilities of consumption and output and
investment. However, he does not evaluate predictability in asset returns, make a detailed
comparison of correlation properties (impulse-responses) of macro time series, or begin work
on the cross-section of asset returns.
Jermann also points out the volatility of the risk free rate. This is a central and important
problem in this sort of model. Devices such as adjustment costs and habits that raise
the variation of marginal rates of substitution across states, and hence generate the equity
premium, tend also to raise the variation of marginal rates of substitution over time,a n d
thus give rise to excessive risk free rate variation. On the preference side, the nonlinear habit
in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) is one device for quelling interest rate volatility with a
high equity premium; a move to Epstein-Zin preferences is another common ingredient for
solving this puzzle. Adding a second linear technology might work, but might give back
the excessive smoothness of consumption growth. Production technologies such as (24) may
allow us to separately control the variability of marginal rates of transformation across states
and marginal rates of transformation over time. In the meantime, we learn that checking
interest rate volatility is an important question to ask of any general equilibrium model in
ﬁnance.
Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001) is a good example of more recent work in this
area. Obviously, one task is to ﬁt more facts with the model. Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher
focus on quantity dynamics. Habit persistence and adjustment costs or other frictions to
investment constitute a dramatic change relative to standard real business cycle models, and
one would suspect that they would radically change the dynamics of output, consumption,
investment and so forth. Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher’s major result is the opposite: the
frictions they introduce actually improve on the standard model’s description of quantity
dynamics, in particular the model’s ability to replicate hump-shaped dynamics rather than
simple exponential decay.
Rather than adjustment costs, Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher have a separate capital-
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eﬀect: one cannot transform consumption costlessly to capital, so the relative prices of capital
(stocks) and consumption goods can vary. They include additional frictions, in particular
t h a tl a b o rm u s tb eﬁxed one period in advance. Like Jermann, they include only the one-
period habit ct − bct−1 rather than the autoregressive habit (18). They replicate the equity
premium, though again with a bit too much interest rate volatility. The big improvement in
this paper comes on the quantity side.
The next obvious step in this program is to unite the relative success of the Campbell-
Cochrane (1999) habit speciﬁcation with a ﬂeshed-out production technology, in the style
of Jermann (1998) or Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (1999). Such a paper would present a
full set of quantity dynamics as it matches the equity premium, a relatively stable risk-free
rate, and time-varying expected returns and return predictability. As far as I know, nobody
as put these elements together yet.
Does the divorce make sense?
Tallarini (2000) goes after a deep puzzle in this attempt to unite general equilibrium
macroeconomics and asset pricing. If asset pricing phenomena require such a complete
overhaul of equilibrium business cycle models, why did nobody notice all the missing pieces
before? Why did a generation of macroeconomists trying to match quantity dynamics alone
not ﬁnd themselves forced to adopt fairly extreme and long-lasting habit persistence in
preferences and adjustment costs or other frictions in technology? Of course, one answer,
implicit in Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001) is that they should have; that these ingre-
dients help the standard model to match the hump-shaped dynamics of impulse-response
functions that real business cycle models have so far failed to match well. But the modeling
innovations are pretty extreme compared to the improvement in quantity dynamics.
Tallarini explores a diﬀerent possibility, one that I think we should keep in mind; that
maybe the divorce between real business cycle macroeconomics and ﬁnance isn’t that short-
sighted after all. (At least leaving out welfare questions, in which case models with identical
dynamics can make wildly diﬀerent predictions.) Tallarini adapts Epstein-Zin preferences to
a standard RBC model; utility is

















Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt + It
where X is stochastic productivity and N is labor. The Epstein-Zin preferences allow him
to raise risk aversion while keeping intertemporal substitution constant. As he does so, he
is better able to account for the market price of risk or Sharpe ratio of the stock market
( m e a ns t o c k - b o n dr e t u r n/s t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o n), but the quantity dynamics remain almost
unchanged. In Tallarini’s world, macroeconomists might well not have noticed the need for
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There is a strong intuition for Tallarini’s result. In the real business cycle model without
adjustment costs, risk comes entirely from the technology shock, and there is nothing anyone
can do about it, since as above, production sets are Leontief across states of nature. The
production function allows relatively easy transformation over time, however, with a little
bit of interest rate variation as ∂f(K,N)/∂K varies a small amount. Thus, if you raise the
intertemporal substitution elasticity, you can get quite diﬀerent business cycle dynamics as
agents choose more or less smooth consumption paths. But if you raise the risk aversion
coeﬃcient without changing intertemporal substitution, saving, dissaving or working can do
nothing to mitigate the now frightful technology shocks, so quantity dynamics are largely
unaﬀected. The real business cycle model is essentially an endowment economy across states
of nature.
With this intuition we can see that Tallarini does not quite establish that “macroe-
conomists safely go on ignoring ﬁnance.” First of all, the welfare costs of ﬂuctuations rise
with risk aversion. Lucas’ famous calculation that welfare costs of ﬂuctuations are small de-
pends on small risk aversion, and Lucas’s model with power utility and low risk aversion is a
disaster on asset pricing facts including the equity premium and return volatility. Tallarini’s
observational equivalence cuts both ways: business cycle facts tell you nothing about risk
aversion. You have to look to prices for risk aversion, and they say risk aversion, and hence
the cost of ﬂuctuations, is large. (See Alvarez and Jermann 2004 for an explicit calculation
along these lines.)
Second, the equity premium is Tallarini’s only asset pricing fact. In particular, with no
adjustment costs, he still has Q=1 at all times, so there is no stock price variation. Even
when there is a high Sharpe ratio, both the mean stock return and its standard deviation
are low. Papers that want to match more facts, including the mean and standard deviation
of returns separately, price-dividend ratio variation, return predictability and cross-sectional
value / growth eﬀects, are driven to add habits and adjustment costs or the more complex
ingredients. In these models, higher risk premia may well aﬀect investment/consumption
decisions and business cycle dynamics, as suggested by Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher.
For these reasons, I think that we will not end up with a pure “separation theorem” of
quantity and price dynamics. I certainly hope not! But the simple form of the observation
given by Tallarini is worth keeping in mind. The spillovers may not be as strong as we
think, and we may well be able to excuse macroeconomists for not noticing the quantity
implications of ingredients we need to add to understand asset prices and the joint evolution
of asset prices and quantities.
Intangible capital
If prices and quantities in standard models and using standard measurement conven-
tions resist lining up, perhaps those models or measurements are at fault. Hall (2001) is a
provocative paper suggesting this view. In thinking about the extraordinary rise of stock
values in the late 1990s, we so far have thought of a fairly stable quantity of capital mul-
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of measured investment, but the resulting increase in the quantity of capital did not come
close to accounting for the large increase in stock market valuations.
The stock market values proﬁts t r e a m s ,h o w e v e r ,n o tj u s tp h y s i c a lc a p i t a l .Aﬁrm is
b r i c k sa n dm o r t a rt ob es u r e ,b u ti ti sa l s oi d e as, organizations, corporate culture and so
on. All of these elements of “intangible capital” are crucial to proﬁts, yet they do not show
up on the books, and nor does the output of “intangible goods” that are accumulated to
“intangible capital.” Could the explosion of stock values in the late 1990s reﬂect a much
more normal valuation of a huge, unmeasured stock of “intangible capital,” accumulated
from unmeasured “output of intangibles?” Hall pursues the asset pricing implications of
this view. (This is the tip of an iceberg of work in macroeconomics and accounting on the
eﬀects of potential intangible capital.) Hall allows for adjustment costs and some variation
in the price of installed vs. uninstalled capital, and backs out the size of those costs from
investment data and reasonable assumptions for the size of adjustment costs. These are not
suﬃcient, so he ﬁnds that the bulk of stock market values in the late 1990s came from a
large quantity of intangible capital.
This is a provocative paper, throwing in to question much of the measurement underlying
all of the macroeconomic models so far. It has its diﬃculties — it’s hard to account for the
large stock market declines as loss of “organizational capital,” — but it bears thinking about.
The cross-section of returns
Obviously, the range of asset pricing phenomena addressed by this sort of model needs
to be expanded, in particular to address cross-sectional results such as the value and growth
eﬀects.
Menzly, Santos and Veronesi (2004) approach the question through a “multiple-endowment”
economy. They model the cashﬂows of the multiple technologies, but not the investment and
labor decisions that go behind these cashﬂows. They specify a clever model for the shares
of each cashﬂow in consumption so that the shares add up to one and the model is easy to
solve for equilibrium prices. They specify a long-lived autoregressive habit, which can gen-
erate long-horizon return predictability and slow movement of the price/dividend ratio as in
Campbell and Cochrane (1999). They generate value and growth eﬀects in cross-sectional
average returns from the interaction between the changes in aggregate risk premium and the
v a r i a t i o ni ns h a r e s . W h e nac a s h ﬂow is temporarily low, the duration of that cashﬂow is
longer since more of the expected cashﬂows are pushed out to the future. This makes the
cashﬂow more exposed to the aggregate risk premium, giving it a higher expected return
and a lower price.
The obvious next step is to amplify its underpinnings to multiple production functions,
allowing us understand the joint determination of asset prices with output, investment, labor,
etc., moving from a “multiple-endowment” economy to “multiple production” economies
just as the single representative ﬁrm literature did in moving from Mehra and Prescott’s
endowment model to the production models discussed above. Berk, Green and Naik (1999),
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models with a bit more explicit, but also fairly stylized, technologies. For example, Gomes,
Kogan and Zhang envision “projects” that arrive continuously; ﬁrms can decide to undertake
a project by paying a cost, but then the scale of the project is ﬁxed forever. Zhang (2005) uses
a multiple-sector technology of the usual y = θf(k) form with adjustment costs and both
aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, but speciﬁes the discount factor process exogenously,
rather than via a utility function and consumption that is driven by the output of the ﬁrms
in his model. Gourio (2004) generates book/market eﬀects in an economy with relatively
standard adjustment-cost technology and ﬁnds some interesting conﬁr m a t i o ni nt h ed a t a .
Gala (2006) is the latest addition to this line of research. This is a full general equilibrium
model — the discount factor comes from consumption via a utility function — with a relatively
standard production function. He includes adjustment costs and irreversibilities. The model
produces value and growth eﬀects. Fast-growing ﬁrms are investing and so on the positive,
adjustment-cost side of the investment function. Value ﬁrms are shrinking and up against
irreversibility constraints. Thus, when a shock comes, the growth ﬁrms can adjust production
plans more than value ﬁrms can, so value ﬁrms are more aﬀected by the shocks. Gala has one
non-standard element; there is an “externality” in that investment is easier (lower adjustment
costs) for small ﬁrms. This solves a technical aggregation problem, and also produces size
eﬀects that would be absent in a completely homogenous model.
Challenges for general equilibrium models of the cross-section
Bringing multiple ﬁrms in at all is the ﬁrst challenge for a general equilibrium model
that want to address the cross section of returns. Since the extra technologies represent
nonzero net supply assets, each “ﬁrm” adds another state variable to the equilibrium. Some
papers circumvent this problem by modeling the discount factor directly as a function of
shocks rather than specify preferences and derive the discount factor from the equilibrium
consumption process. Then each ﬁr mc a nb ev a l u e di ni s o l a t i o n .T h i si saﬁne shortcut in
order to learn about useful speciﬁcations of technology, but in the end of course we don’t
really understand risk premia until they come from the equilibrium consumption process fed
through a utility function. Other papers are able cleverly to prune the state space or ﬁnd
suﬃcient statistics for the entire distribution of ﬁrms in order to make the models tractable.
The second challenge is to produce “value” and “growth” ﬁrms that have low and high
valuations. Furthermore, the low valuations of “value” ﬁrms must correspond to high ex-
pected returns, not entirely low cashﬂow prospects, and vice versa for growth. This challenge
has largely been met too.
The third challenge is to reproduce the failures of the CAPM, as in the data. Again,
t h ep u z z l ei sn o ts om u c ht h eexistence of value and growth ﬁrms but the fact that these
characteristics do not correspond to betas. A model in which some ﬁrms have high-beta
cashﬂows and some ﬁrms have low-beta cashﬂows will generate a spread in expected returns,
and prices will be lower for the high expected-return ﬁr m ss ow ew i l ls e ev a l u ea n dg r o w t h
eﬀects. But these eﬀects will be explained by the betas. Few of the current models re-
ally achieve this step. Most models price assets by a conditional CAPM or a conditional
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of the CAPM in the models are due to omitting conditioning information or the fact that
the stock market is imperfectly correlated with consumption. In most models, these features
do not account quantitatively for the failures of the CAPM or consumption-based model in
the data.
Fourth, a model must produce the comovement of value and growth ﬁrm returns that
lies behind the Fama-French factors. Most models still have a single aggregate shock. And
we haven’t started talking about momentum or other anomalies.
Finally, let us not forget the full range of aggregate asset pricing facts including equity
premium, low and smooth risk free rate, return predictability, price-dividend ratio volatility
and so forth, along with quantity dynamics that are at least as good as the standard real
business cycle model.
I remain a bit worried about the accuracy of approximations in general equilibrium model
solutions. Most papers solve their models by making a linear-quadratic approximation about
a nonstochastic steady state. But the central fact of life that makes ﬁnancial economics
interesting is that risk premia are not at all second order. The equity premium of 8% is much
larger than the interest rate of 1%. Thinking of risk as a “second - order” eﬀect, expanding
around a 1% interest rate in a perfect foresight model, seems very dangerous. There is an
alternative but less popular approach, exempliﬁed by Hansen (1987). Rather than specify a
nonlinear and unsolvable model, and then ﬁnd a solution by linear-quadratic approximation,
Hansen writes down a linear-quadratic (approximate) model, and then quickly ﬁnds an
exact solution. This technique, emphasized in a large number of papers by Hansen and
Sargent, might avoid many approximation and computation issues, especially as the state
space expands with multiple ﬁrms. Hansen (1987) is also is a very nice exposition of how
general equilibrium asset-pricing economies work, and well worth reading on those grounds
alone.
Clearly, there is much do to in the integration of asset pricing and macroeconomics.
It’s tempting to throw up one’s hands and go back to factor ﬁshing, or partial equilibrium
economic models. They are however only steps on the way. We will not be able to say
we understand the economics of asset prices until we have a complete model that generates
artiﬁcial time series that look like those in the data.
What does it mean to say that we “explain” a high expected return Et(Rt+1) “because”
the return covaries strongly with consumption growth or the market return covt(Rt+1∆ct+1)
or covt(Rt+1Rm
t+1)? Isn’t the covariance of the return, formed from the covariance of tomor-
row’s price with a state variable, every bit as much an endogenous variable as the expected
return, formed from the level of today’s price? I think we got into this habit by historical
accident. In a one-period model, the covariance is driven by the exogenous liquidating div-
idend, so it makes a bit more sense to treat the covariance as exogenous and today’s price
or expected return as endogenous. If the world had constant expected returns, so that inno-
vations in tomorrow’s price were simple reﬂections of tomorrow’s dividend news, it’s almost
as excusable. But given that so much price variation is driven by expected return variation,
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betas to expected returns makes no sense at all.
General equilibrium models force us to avoid this sophistry. They force us to generate the
covariance of returns with state variables endogenously along with all asset prices; they force
us to tie asset prices, returns, expected returns, and covariances all back to the behavior
of fundamental cash ﬂows and consumption, and they even force us to trace those “funda-
mentals” back to truly exogenous shocks that propagate through technology and utility by
optimal decisions. General equilibrium models force us (ﬁnally) to stop treating tomorrow’s
price as an exogenous variable; to focus on pricing rather than one period returns.
This feature provides great discipline to the general equilibrium modeler, and it makes
reverse-engineering a desired result much harder, perhaps accounting for slow progress and
technically demanding papers. As a simple example, think about raising the equity premium
in the Mehra-Prescott economy. This seems simple enough; the ﬁrst order condition is
Et(Re
t+1) ≈ γcovt(Re
t+1,∆ct+1), so just raise the risk aversion coeﬃcient γ. If you try this, in a
sensible calibration that mimics the slight positive autocorrelation of consumption growth in
postwar data, you get a large negative equity premium. The problem is that the covariance is
endogenous in this model; it does not sit still as you change assumptions. With positive serial
correlation of consumption growth, good news about today’s consumption growth implies
good news to future consumption growth. With a large risk aversion coeﬃcient, good news
about future consumption growth lowers the stock price, since the “discount rate” eﬀect is
larger than the “wealth” eﬀect.9 In this way, the model endogenously generates a negative
covariance term. To boost the equity premium, you have also to change assumptions on
the consumption process (or the nature of preferences) to raise the risk aversion coeﬃcient
without destroying the covariance.
As this survey makes clear, we have only begun to scratch the surface of explicit general
equilibrium models — models that start with preferences, technology, shocks, market structure
— that can address basic asset pricing and macroeconomic facts including the equity premium,
predictable returns, and value, size, and similar eﬀects in the cross-section of returns.





















With γ>1, a rise in Ct+j/Ct lowers Pt/Ct.
586 Labor income and idiosyncratic risk
The basic economics we are chasing is the idea that assets must pay a higher average return
if they do badly in “bad times,” and we are searching for the right macroeconomic measure
of “bad times.” A natural idea in this context is to include labor income risks in our measure
“bad times.” Surely people will avoid stocks that do badly when they have just lost their jobs,
or are at great risk for doing so. Here, I survey models that emphasize overall employment
as a state variable (“labor income”) and then models that emphasize increases in individual
risk from non-market sources (“idiosyncratic risk”).
6.1 Labor and outside income
T h ee c o n o m i c so fl a b o ri n c o m ea sas t a t ev a r i a b l ea r eal i t t l et r i c k y .I fu t i l i t yi ss e p a r a b l e
between consumption and leisure, then consumption should summarize labor income infor-
mation as it summarizes all other economically relevant risks. If someone loses their job and
this is bad news, they should consume less as well, and consumption should therefore reveal
a l lw en e e dt ok n o wa b o u tt h er i s k .
Labor hours can also enter, as above, if utility is non-separable between consumption and
leisure. However, current work on labor income work does not stress this possibility, perhaps
again because we don’t have much information about the cross-elasticity. Does more leisure
make you hungrier, or does it substitute for other goods?
A better motivation for labor income risk, as for most traditional factor models in ﬁnance,
is the suspicion that consumption data are poorly measured or otherwise correspond poorly
to the constructs of the model. The theory of ﬁnance from the CAPM on downward
consists of various tricks for using determinants of consumption such as wealth (CAPM) or
news about future investment opportunities (ICAPM) in place of consumption itself; not
because anything is wrong with the consumption-based model in the theory, but on the
supposition that it is poorly measured in practice. With that motivation, labor income is
one big determinant of consumption or one big source of wealth that is not included in stock
market indices. Many investors also have privately-held businesses, and the income from
those businesses aﬀects their asset demands exactly as does labor income, so we can think
of the two issues simultaneously.
Measurement is still tricky. The present value of labor income, or the value of “human
capital,” belongs most properly in asset pricing theory. Consumption does not decline
(marginal utility of wealth does not rise) if you lose your job and you know you can quickly
get a better one. Now, one can certainly cook up a theory in which labor income itself
tells us a lot about the present value of labor income. An AR(1) time series model and
constant discount rates are the standard assumptions, but they are obviously implausible.
For example, the same procedure applied to stocks says that today’s dividend tells us all
we need to know about stock prices; that a beta on dividend growth would give the same
answer as a beta on returns, that price-dividend ratios are exact functions of each period’s
59dividend growth. We would laugh at any paper that did this for stocks, yet it is standard
practice for labor income.
Still, the intuition for the importance of labor income risk is strong. The paragraph from
Fama and French (1996, p. 77) quoted above combines some of the “labor income” risk here
and the “idiosyncratic risk” that follows. What remains is to ﬁnd evidence in the data for
these mechanisms.
Labor income growth in linear discount factor models
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) is so far the most celebrated recent model that includes
a labor income variable. (See also the successful extension in Jagannathan, Kubota, and









where the betas are deﬁned as usual from time series regressions
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VW is the value weighted market return, prem is the previous month’s BAA-AAA yield
spread and labor is the previous month’s growth in a two-month moving average of labor
income. prem is included as a conditioning variable; this is a restricted speciﬁcation of a
conditional CAPM. (“Restricted” because in general one would include prem × VW and
prem × labor as factors, as in Lettau and Ludvigson’s 2001b conditional CAPM.)
With VW and prem alone, Jagannathan and Wang report only 30% cross-sectional R2
(average return on betas), presumably because the yield spread does not forecast returns as
well as the cay variable used in a similar fashion by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b). Adding
labor income, they obtain up to 55% cross-sectional10 R2 .
Alas, the testing ground is not portfolios sorted by book to market ratio, but 100 portfolios
sorted by beta and size. Jagannathan and Wang do check (Table VI) that the Fama French
3 factor model does no better (55% cross-sectional R2) on their portfolios, but we don’t know
from the paper if labor income prices the book/market sorted portfolios. Furthermore, the
paper makes the usual assumption that labor income is a random walk and is valued with
a constant discount rate so that the current change in labor income measures the change
in its present value (p. 14 “we assume that the return on human capital is an exact linear
function of the growth rate in per capita labor income”). Finally, the labor income factor
labort =[ Lt−1 + Lt−2]/[Lt−2 − Lt−3] means that the factor is really news about aggregate
labor income, since Lt−1 data is released at time t, rather than actual labor income as
experienced by workers.
10Again, I pass on these numbers with some hesitation — unless the model is ﬁtb ya nO L Sc r o s s -
sectional regression, the R2 depends on technique and even on how you calculate it. Only under OLS
is var(xβ)/var(y)=1− var(ε)/var(y). Yet cross-sectional R2 is a popular statistic to report, even for
models not ﬁt by OLS cross-sectional regression.
60Much of Jagannathan and Wang’s empirical point can be seen in Table 1 of Lettau
and Ludvigson (2001b), reproduced below. ∆y is labor income growth, this time measured
contemporaneously. Lettau and Ludvigson use the consumption to wealth ratio cay rather
than the bond premium as the conditioning variable, which may account for the better
results. Most importantly, they also examine the Fama-French 25 size and book/market
portfolios which allows us better to compare across models in this standard playground.
They actually ﬁnd reasonable performance (58% R2)i na nunconditional model that includes
only the market return and labor income growth as factors. Adding the scaled factors of the
conditional model, i.e.
mt+1 = a + b1R
VW






+ b5 (cayt × ∆yt+1)
they achieve essentially the same R2 as the Fama - French 3 factor model.
Figure 4: Lettau and Ludvigson Table 1
The take-away point, then, is that a large number of macroeconomic variables can be
added to ad-hoc linear factor models (mt+1 = a−bft+1) to price the Fama-French 25 portfo-
lios, including consumption, investment, and now labor income. Of course the usual caveat
61applies that there are really only three independent assets in the Fama-French 25 portfolios
(market, hml, smb), so one should be cautious about models with many factors.
Explicit modeling of labor income in a VAR framework.
Campbell (1996) uses labor income in a three-factor model. His factors are 1) the market
return 2) innovations in variables that help to forecast future market returns 3) innovations
in variables that help to forecast future labor income. The analysis starts from a vector
autoregression including the market return, real labor income growth, and as forecasting
variables the dividend/price ratio, a detrended interest rate and a credit spread.
This paper has many novel and distinguishing features. First, despite the nearly 40
years that have passed since Merton’s (1973) theoretical presentation of the ICAPM only a
very small number of empirical papers have ever checked that their proposed factors do, in
fact, forecast market returns. This is one of the rare exceptions. (Ferson and Harvey 1999,
Brennan, Xia and Wang 2005 are the only other ones I know of.) Campbell’s factors also
forecast current and future labor income, again taking one big step closer to innovations
in human capital rather than just the ﬂow of labor income. Finally, parameters are tied to
estimates of fundamental parameters such as risk aversion, rather than being left unexamined
as is the usual practice.
Alas, this paper came out before that much attention was lavished on the book/market
eﬀect, so the test portfolios are an intersection of size and industry portfolios. Size really does
little more than sort on market beta, and industry portfolios give little variation in expected
returns, as seen in Campbell’s Table 5. As one might suspect, most variation in the present
value of labor income and return comes not from current labor income or changing forecasts
of future labor income, but from a changing discount rate applied to labor income. However,
the discount rate here is the same as the stock market discount rate. On one hand we expect
discount rate variation to dominate the present value of labor income, as it does in stock
prices. This model serves as a good warning to the vast majority of researchers who blithely
use current labor income to proxy for the present value of future labor income. On the other
hand, though, it’s not obvious that the stock discount rate should apply to labor income,
and at a data level it means that labor income is really not a new factor. The bottom line is
on p. 336: The CAPM is pretty good on size portfolios, and other factors do not seem that
important.
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) follow on the ICAPM component of Campbell (1996).
They break the standard CAPM beta into two components, a “bad” cashﬂow beta that
measures how much an asset return declines if expected future market cashﬂows decline,
and “good” return beta that measures how much an asset return declines if a rise in future
expected returns lowers prices today. The latter beta is “good” because in an ICAPM world
(long-lived investors) it should have a lower risk premium. Ignoring the troubling small-
growth portfolio, the improvement of the two-beta model over the CAPM on the Fama
French 25 portfolios can be seen quickly in their Figure 3. Petkova (2006) also estimates an
ICAPM-like model on the Fama-French 25 portfolios, ﬁnding that innovations to the dividend
yield, term spread, default spread and level of the interest rate, all variables known to forecast
62the market return, can account for the average returns of the Fama-French 25. Ultimately,
ICAPM models should be part of macro-ﬁnance as well, since the “state variables” must
forecast consumption as well as the market return in order to inﬂuence prices.
Proprietary income
Heaton and Lucas (2000) note that proprietary income — the income from non-marketed
businesses — should be as, if not more, important to asset pricing than labor income as
measured by Jagannathan and Wang. For rich people who own stocks, ﬂuctuations in
proprietary income are undoubtedly a larger concern than are ﬂuctuations in wages. They
ﬁnd that individuals with more and more volatile proprietary income in fact hold less stocks.
They also replicate Jagannathan and Wang’s investigation (using the same 100 industry/beta
portfolios) using proprietary income. Using Jagannathan and Wang’s timing, they ﬁnd that
proprietary income is important, but more importantly the proprietary income series still
works using “normal” timing rather than the one-period lag in Jagannathan and Wang.
Micro data
Malloy, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jorgenson (2005) take another big step in the labor in-
come direction. Among other reﬁnements, they check whether their model explains portfolios
sorted on book/market, size and momentum as well as individual stocks; they use measures
of hiring and ﬁring rather than the quite smooth average earnings data; and they measure
the permanent component of labor income which at least gets one step closer to the present
value or human capital that should matter in theory. They ﬁnd good performance of the
model in book/market sorted portfolios, suggesting that labor income risk (or associated
macroeconomic risk) really is behind the “value eﬀect”
Am o d e l
Santos and Veronesi (2005) study a two-sector version of the model in Menzly, Santos
and Veronesi (2004). They think of the two sec t o r sa sl a b o ri n c o m e( h u m a nc a p i t a l )v s .
market or dividend income, corresponding to physical capital. A conditional CAPM holds
in the model in which the ratio of labor income to total income is a conditioning variable —
expected returns etc. vary as this ratio varies. In addition, the relevant market return is the
total wealth portfolio including human capital, and so shocks to the value of labor income
are priced as well. This is completely-solved model nicely shows the potential eﬀects of labor
income on asset pricing.
One part of Santos and Veronesi’s empirical work checks that the ratio of labor to total
income forecasts aggregate returns; it does and better than the dividend price ratio, adding
to evidence that macro variables forecast stock returns. The second part of the empirical
work checks whether the factors can account for the average returns of the 25 Fama-French
size and book/market portfolios (Table 6). Here, adding the ratio of labor to total income
as a conditioning variable helps a lot, raising the cross-sectional R2 from nearly zero for
the CAPM to 50% for this conditional CAPM, in line with Lettau and Ludvigson’s (2001)
conditional labor-income model that uses cay as a conditioning variable. Alas, adding shocks
to the present value of labor income (measured here by changes in wages, with all the usual
63warnings) as a factor does not help much, either alone or in combination with the condi-
tioning variables. The major success with this speciﬁcation comes then as a conditioning
variable rather than as a risk factor.
6.2 Idiosyncratic risk, stockholding and microdata
In most of our thinking about macroeconomics and ﬁnance, we use a “representative con-
sumer.” We analyze economy-wide aggregates, making a ﬁrst approximation that the dis-
tribution across consumers, while important and interesting, does not aﬀect the evolution
of aggregate prices or quantities. We say that a “tax cut” or “interest rate reduction” may
increase “consumption” or “savings,” thereby aﬀecting “employment” and “output,” but
we ignore the possibility that the eﬀect is diﬀerent if it hits people diﬀerently. Of course the
theory needed to justify perfectly this simpliﬁcation is extreme, but seems a quite sensible
ﬁrst-approximation.
Macroeconomics and ﬁnance are thus full of investigations whether cross-sectional distri-
butions matter. Two particular strains of this investigation are important for us. Second,
perhaps idiosyncratic risk matters. Perhaps people fear stocks not because they might fall
at a time when total employment or labor income falls, but because they might fall at a time
when the cross-sectional risk of unemployment or labor income increases. Second, most
people don’t hold any stocks at all. Therefore, their consumption may be de-linked from the
stock market, and models that connect the stock market only to those who actually hold
stocks might be more successful. Both considerations suggest examining our central asset
pricing conditions using individual household data rather than aggregate consumption data.
Constantinides and Duﬃe and idiosyncratic risk
Basically, Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996) prove a constructive existence theorem: there
is a speciﬁcation of idiosyncratic income risk that can explain any premium, using only power
(constant relative risk aversion, time-separable) utility, and they show you how to construct
that process. This is a brilliant contribution as a decade of research into idiosyncratic risk
h a ds t u m b l e da g a i n s to n ea f t e ra n o t h e rd i ﬃculty, and had great trouble demonstrate even
the possibility of substantial eﬀects.
Constantinides and Duﬃe’s Equation (11) gives the central result, which I reproduce




















t+1 is the cross-sectional variance of individual log consumption growth taken after
aggregates at time t+1 are known. Equation (26) adds the exponential term to the standard
consumption-based asset pricing equation. Since you can construct a discount factor (term
before Rt+1) to represent any asset-pricing anomaly, you can construct a idiosyncratic risk
64process y2
t+1 to rationalize any asset-pricing anomaly. For example, DeSantis (2005) con-
structs a model in which the conditional variance of y2
t+1varies slowly over time, acting in
many ways like the Campbell-Cochrane surplus consumption ratio (19) and generating the
same facts in a simulation economy.
The nonlinearity of marginal utility is the key to the Constantinides-Duﬃer e s u l t .Y o u
might have thought that idiosyncratic risk cannot matter. Anything idiosyncratic must be or-
thogonal to aggregates, including the market return, so E(mt+1+εi
t+1,R t+1)=E(mt+1,R t+1).
But the shocks should be to consumption or income,n o tt omarginal utility,a n d m a r g i n a l










we see that a nonlinear m will lead to a Jensen’s inequality 1/2σ2 term, which is exactly
the exponential term in (26). Thus, if the cross-sectional variance of idiosyncratic shocks is
higher when returns Rt+1 a r eh i g h e r ,w ew i l ls e eap r e m i u mt h a td o e sn o tm a k es e n s ef r o m
aggregate consumption. The derivation of (26) follows exactly this logic and doesn’t take
much extra algebra11.
Idiosyncratic consumption-growth risk yt+1 plays the part of consumption growth in
the standard models. In order to generate risk premia, then, we need the distribution
of idiosyncratic risk to vary over time; it must widen when high-average-return securities
(stocks vs. bonds, value stocks vs. growth stocks) decline. It needs to widen unexpectedly,


















You can see by inspection that yt+1 is the cross-sectional variance of individual log consumption growth.
Aggregate consumption really is the sum of individual consumption — the −1
2y2













































































































65to generate a covariance with returns, and so as not to generate a lot of variation in interest
rates. And, if we are to avoid high risk aversion, it needs to widen al o t .
As with the equity premium, the challenge for the idiosyncratic risk view is about quan-






means that the discount factor m must vary by 50% or so. (E(Re) ≈ 8%, σ(Re) ≈ 16%,






















With γ = 1, then, we need σ(y2
t+1)=0 .5. Now, if the level of the cross-sectional variance
were 0.5, that would mean a cross-sectional standard deviation of
√
0.5=0 .71. This number
s e e m sm u c ht o ol a r g e .C a ni tb et r u et h a ti fa g g regate consumption growth is 2%, the typical
person you meet either has +73% or -69% consumption growth? But the problem is worse
than this, because 0.71 does not describe the level of idiosyncratic consumption growth, it
must represent the unexpected increase or decrease in idiosyncratic risk in a typical year.
Slow, business-cycle related var i a t i o ni ni d i o s y n c r a t i cr i s ky2
t+1will give rise to changes in
interest rates, not a risk premium. Based on this sort of simple calculation, the reviews
in Cochrane (1997) and Cochrane (2004) suggest that idiosyncratic risk model will have to
rely on high risk aversion, just like the standard consumption model, to ﬁt the standard
asset-pricing facts.
Again, I am not criticizing the basic mechanism or the plausibility of the signs. My only
point is that in order to get anything like plausible magnitudes, idiosyncratic risk models
seem destined to need high risk aversion just like standard models.
T h es i t u a t i o ng e t sw o r s ea sw et h i n ka b o u td i ﬀerent time horizons. The required volatility
of individual consumption growth, and the size of unexpected changes in that volatility
σt(y2
t+h) must explode as the horizon shrinks. The Sharpe ratio Et(Re)/σt(Re) declines with
the square root of horizon, so σt(mt,t+h) must decline with the square root of horizon h.B u t
y2
t+h governs the variance of individual consumption growth, not its standard deviation,a n d
variances usually decline linearly with horizon. If σt(y2
t+h) declines only with the square root
of horizon, then typical values of the level of y2
t+h must also decline only with the square root
of horizon, since y2
t+h must remain positive. That fact means that the annualized variance of
individual consumption growth must rise unboundedly as the observation interval shrinks. In
sum, neither consumption nor the conditional variance of consumption growth y2
t can follow
diﬀusion (random walk-like) processes. Both must instead follow a jump process in order
to allow enormous variance at short horizons. (Of course, they may do so. We are used
to using diﬀusions, but the sharp breaks in individual income and consumption on rare big
events like being ﬁred may well be better modeled by a jump process.)
In a sense, we knew that individual consumption would have to have extreme variance
66at short horizons to get this mechanism to work. Grossman and Shiller (1982) showed that
marginal utility is linear in continuous-time models when consumption and asset prices follow
diﬀusions; it’s as if utility were quadratic. The basic pricing equation is, in continuous time
Et (dRt) − r
f









where dRt = dPt/Pt + Dt/Ptdt is the instantaneous total return. The average of dCi/Ci
across people must equal the aggregate, dC/C,s ow eh a v e
Et (dRt) − r
f







Aggregation holds even with incomplete markets and nonlinear utility, and the Constantinides-
Duﬃee ﬀect has disappeared. It has disappeared into terms of order dzdt and higher of
course. To keep the Constantinides-Duﬃee ﬀect, one must suppose that dCi/Ci has vari-
ance larger than order dz, i.e. that it does not follow a diﬀusion12.
Conversely, we may anticipate the same generic problem that many models have at
long horizons. Like many models (See the Cambpbell-Cochrane discussion above), the
Constantinides-Duﬃe model (26) adds a multiplicative term to the standard power-utility
discount factor. To generate an equity premium at long-horizons, the extra term must also
have a variance that grows linearly with time, as does the variance of consumption growth,
and functions of stationary variables such as the cross-sectional variance idiosyncratic shocks
usually does not growth with horizon, leaving us back to the power utility model at long
horizons.
Empirical work
Of course, empirical arguments should be madew i t hd a t a ,n o to nt h eb a c k so fe n v e l o p e s .
Empirical work on whether variation in the cross-sectional distribution of income and con-
sumption is important for asset pricing is just beginning.
Most investigations ﬁnd some support for the basic eﬀect — consumption and income do
become more volatile across people in recessions and at times when the stock market declines.
However, they conﬁrm that the magnitudes a r en o tl a r g ee n o u g ht oe x p l a i nt h ee q u i t yo r
value premia without high risk aversion. Heaton and Lucas (1996) calibrate an income pro-
cess from the PSID and ﬁnd it does not have the required volatility or correlation with stock
market declines. Cogley (2002) examines the cross-sectional properties of consumption from
the consumer expenditure survey. He ﬁnds that “cross-sectional factors” — higher moments
of the cross-sectional distribution of consumption growth — “are indeed weakly correlated
with stock returns, and they generate equity premia of 2 percent or less when the coeﬃcient
12There is another logical possibility. Et (dRt)=r
f
t dt does not imply Et(Rt+1)=R
f
t if interest rates vary
strongly over time, so one could construct a Constantinides-Duﬃed i s c r e t et i m em o d e lw i t hc o n s u m p t i o n
that follows a diﬀusion, and hence no inﬁnitesimal risk premium, but instead strong instantaneous interest
rate variation. I don’t think anyone would want to do so.
67of relative risk aversion is below 5.” Even ignoring the distinction between consumption
and income, Lettau (2002) ﬁnds that the cross-sectional distribution of idiosyncratic income
does not vary enough to explain the equity premium puzzle without quite high risk aver-
sion. Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2005) document greater dispersion in labor income
across households in PSID in recessions, but they do not connect that greater dispersion
to asset pricing. Constantinides and Duﬃe’s model also requires a substantial permanent
component to idiosyncratic labor income, in order to keep consumers from smoothing it by
saving and dissaving. Yet standard calibrations such as in Heaton and Lucas (1996) don’t
ﬁnd enough persistence in the data. Of course, abundant measurement error in micro data
will give the false appearance of mean-reversion, but if labor income were really very volatile
and persistent, then the distribution of income would fan out quickly and counterfactually
over time.
In contrast, Brav, Constantinides and Geczy (2002) report some asset-pricing success.
They use household consumption data from the consumer expenditure survey and consider
measurement error extensively. They examine one central implication, whether by aggre-
gating marginal utility rather than aggregating consumption, they can explain the equity
premium and (separately) the value premium, 0 = E(mRe). Speciﬁcally, remember that












































Brav, Constantinides and Geczy contrast calculations of (31) with those of (32). This
analysis also shows again how important nonlinearities in marginal utility are to generating
an eﬀect: If marginal utility were linear, as it is under quadratic utility or in continuous
time, then of course averaging consumption would work, and would give the same answer as
aggregating marginal utility.
This estimation is exactly identiﬁed; one moment E(mR) and one parameter γ.B r a v ,
Constantinides and Geczy ﬁnd that aggregating marginal utilities, E(mR)=1t h e ya r ea b l e
to ﬁnd a γ between 2 and 5 that matches the equity premium, i.e. satisﬁe st h es i n g l em o m e n t
restriction. By contrast, using aggregate consumption data, the best ﬁtr e q u i r e sv e r yh i g h
risk aversion, and there is no risk aversion parameter γ that satisﬁes this single moment for
the equity premium. (One equation and one unknown does not guarantee a solution.)
68I hope that future work will analyze this result more fully. What are the time-varying
cross-sectional moments that drive the result, and why did Brav Constantinides and Geczy
ﬁnd them where Cogley and Lettau did not, and my back-of the envelope calculations suggest
that the required properties are extreme? How will this approach work as we extend the
number of assets to be priced, and to be priced simultaneously?
Jacobs and Wang (2004) take a good step in this direction. They use the Fama French
25 size and book to market portfolios as well as some bond returns, and they look at the per-
formance of a two-factor model that includes aggregate consumption plus the cross-sectional
variance of consumption, constructed from consumer expenditure survey data. They ﬁnd
that the cross-sectional variance factor is impo r t a n t( i . e .s h o u l db ei n c l u d e di nt h ed i s c o u n t
factor), and the two consumption factors improve on the (disastrous, in this data) CAPM.
Not surprisingly, of course, the Fama-French ad-hoc factors are not driven out, and the
overall pricing errors remain large however.
Microdata
Of course, individuals still price assets exactly as before. The equation (30) still holds
for each individual’s consumption in all thesem o d e l s .S o ,o n c ew eh a v eo p e n e dt h eC E So r
PSID databases, we could simply test whether asset returns are correctly related to household
level consumption with (30) and forget about aggregation either of consumption (32) or of
marginal utility (31). With micro data, we can also isolate stockholders or households more
likely to own stocks (older, wealthier) and see if the model works better among these.
Alas, this approach is not so easy either: individual consumption data is full of measure-
ment error as well as idiosyncratic risk, and raising measurement error to a large −γ power
can swamp the signal (See Brav, Constantinides and Geczy for an extended discussion.) In
addition individual behavior may not be stationary over time, where aggregates are. For
just this reason (betas vary over time), we use characteristic-sorted portfolios rather than
individual stock data to test asset pricing models. It may make sense to aggregate the m
in 1 = E(mR) just as we aggregate the R into portfolios. Also, typical data sets are short
and do not include a long panel dimension; we do not track individual households over
long periods of time. Finally, equity premium problems are just as diﬃcult for (correctly
measured) individual consumption as for aggregate consumption. For example, the Hansen-
Jagannathan bound says that the volatility of marginal utility growth must exceed 50% per
year (and more, to explain the value premium). For log utility, that means consumption
growth must vary by 50 percentage points per year. This is nondurable consumption and
the ﬂow of durables services, not durables purchases. Buying a house once in 10 years or a
car once in three does not count towards this volatility. Furthermore, only the portion of con-
sumption (really marginal utility) volatility correlated with the stock market counts. Purely
idiosyncratic volatility (due to individual job loss, illness, divorce, etc.) does not count.
D e s p i t et h e s ep r o b l e m s ,t h e r ea r es o m ee m p irical successes in micro data. Mankiw and
Zeldes (1991) ﬁnd that stockholder’s consumption is more volatile and more correlated with
the stock market than that of nonstockholders, a conclusion reinforced by Attanasio, Banks
and Tanner (2002). Ait-Sahalia, Parker and Yogo (2004) ﬁnd that consumption of “luxury
69goods,” presumably enjoyed by stockholders, ﬁts the equity premium with less risk aversion
than that of normal goods. Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) is a good recent example of the large
literature that actually estimates the ﬁrst order condition (30), though only for a single asset
over time rather than for the spread between stocks and bonds. Thus, we are a long way
from a full estimate that accounts for the market as well as the size and value premia (say,
the Fama French 25) and other eﬀects.
Must we use microdata? While initially appealing, however, it’s not clear that the
stockholder/nonstockholder distinction is vital. Are people who hold no stocks really not
“marginal?” The costs of joining the stock market are trivial; just turn oﬀ your spam ﬁlter for
am o m e n ta n dt h a tb e c o m e so b v i o u s .T h u s ,p e o p l ew h od on o ti n v e s ta ta l lchoose not to do
s oi nt h ef a c eo ft r i v i a lﬁxed costs. This choice must reﬂect the attractiveness of a price ratio
relative to the consumer’s marginal rate of substitution; they really are “marginal” or closer
to “marginal” than most theories assume. More formally, Heaton and Lucas (1996) examine
a carefully-calibrated portfolio model and ﬁnd they need a very large transaction cost to
generate the observed equity premium. Even non-stockholders are linked to the stock mar-
ket in various ways. Most data on household asset holdings excludes deﬁned-contribution
pension plans, most of which contain stock market investments. Even employees with a
deﬁned-beneﬁt plan should watch the stock market when making consumption plans, as em-
ployees of United Airlines recently found out to their dismay. Finally, while there are a lot of
people with little stock holding, they also have little consumption and little eﬀect on market
prices. Aggregates weight by dollars, not people, and many more dollars of consumption are
e n j o y e db yr i c hp e o p l ew h oo w ns t o c k st h a nt h enumbers of such people suggests. In sum,
while there is nothing wrong with looking at stockholder data to see if their consumption
really does line up better with stock returns, it is not so obvious that there is something
terribly wrong with continuing to use aggregates, even though few households directly hold
stock.
7 Challenges for the future
Though this review may seem extensive and exhausting, it is clear at the end that work has
barely begun. The challenge is straightforward: we need to understand what macroeconomic
risks underlie the “factor risk premia,” the average returns on special portfolios that ﬁnance
research uses to crystallize the cross section of assets. A current list might include the equity
premium, and its variation over time underlying return forecastability and volatility, the
value and size premiums, the momentum premium, and the time-varying term premia in
bond foreign exchange markets. More premia will certainly emerge through time.
On the empirical side, we are really only starting to understand how the simplest power
utility models do and do not address these premiums, looking across data issues, horizons,
time aggregation and so forth. The success of ad-hoc macro factor and “production” models
in explaining the Fama-French 25 is suggestive, but their performance still needs careful
evaluation and they need connection to economic theory.
70The general equilibrium approach is a vast and largely unexplored new land. The
papers covered here are like Columbus’ report that the land is there. The pressing challenge
is to develop a general equilibrium model with an interesting cross-section. The model
n e e d st oh a v em u l t i p l e“ ﬁrms”; it needs to generate the fact that low-price “value” ﬁrms
have higher returns than high price “growth ﬁrms”; it needs to generate the failure of the
CAPM to account for these returns, and it needs to generate the comovement of value
ﬁrms that underlies Fama and French’s factor model, all this with preference and technology
speciﬁcations that are at least not wildly inconsistent with microeconomic investigation. The
papers surveyed here, while path-breaking advances in that direction, do not come close to
the full list of desiderata.
Having said “macroeconomics,” “risk” and “asset prices,” the reader will quickly spot a
missing ingredient: money. In macroeconomics, monetary shocks and monetary frictions are
considered by many to be an essential ingredient of business cycles. They should certainly
matter at least for bond risk premia. (See Piazzesi 2005 for the state of the art on this
question.) Coming from the other direction, there is now a lot of evidence for “liquidity”
eﬀects in bond and stock markets (see Cochrane 2005a for a review), and perhaps both sorts
of frictions are related.
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849 Appendix
This appendix gives a self-contained derivation of the discount factor under Epestein-Zin
(1991) preferences.
Utility index
The consumer contemplates the purchase of ξ shares at price pt with payoﬀ xt+1.T h e
maximum is achieved where ∂
∂ξUt(ct − ptξ,ct+1 + xt+1ξ)
¯ ¯ ¯
ξ=0






















t (1 − β)c
−ρ
t . (34)





























Substituting from (34) and canceling,
c
−ρ






















































Mt,t+jct+j = Wt (36)
The ﬁnal equality is the deﬁnition of total wealth — the value of the claim to consumption
(including time t consumption). This is the heart of the idea — wealth reveals the utility
index in (35).
85We want an expression with the market return, not wealth itself, so we proceed as follows.

















































































































































so we have in the end
Mt+1 = β
1+γ−ρ ¡
R
W
t+1
¢ρ−γ
1−ρ
µ
ct+1
ct
¶−ρ(
1−γ
1−ρ)
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